Simple Justice by Spann, Girardeau A
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1985 
Simple Justice 
Girardeau A. Spann 
Georgetown University Law Center, spann@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1935 
 
73 Geo. L. J. 1041 (1984-1985) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
Simple Justice*
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN**
The easiest way to deal with unjust discrimination is to ban it. We could
simply adopt a rule that says "unjust discrimination is prohibited" and use it to
resolve any discrimination case that happened to arise. Certainly, no one would
object to the sentiment expressed in such a rule. But some might find the prohi-
bition, too imprecise to be of much help in resolving particular cases. Such a rule
would leave judges with no choice but to fall back on their subjective values in
deciding whether given instances of discrimination were or were not "unjust."
Indeed, because resolution of legal disputes based upon nothing more than the
subjective preferences of judges is inconsistent with our conception of justice, we
have chosen to rely on more elaborate doctrinal rules in order to facilitate princi-
pled resolution of our legal disputes. In theory, conscious recourse to doctrine
permits judges to decide cases in accordance with neutral principles. The princi-
ples, in turn, serve as generally agreed-upon bases for decision, which are suffi-
ciently objective to guard against potential judicial bias.'
The theory never works perfectly, of course, and it is now widely recognized
that even the most neutral-sounding principles both reflect normative prefer-
ences and frequently fail to prevent bias from intruding into the decision making
process.2 In fact, some of the most erudite legal scholarship has traditionally
* Copyright © 1984 by Girardeau A. Spann.
** Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Chuck Ab-
ernathy, Steve Goldberg, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Mitt Regan, Mike Seidman, and Mark Tushnet for
their help in developing the ideas expressed in this article, and I would like to apologize to Richard
Kluger for expropriating a title that he made too perfect to pass up. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
Research for this article was supported by a grant from the Georgetown University Law Center.
1. The most frequently cited articulation of the neutral-principle theory is in Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 15-20 (1959); see also Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1971) (arguing for what may be an even more
rigorous form of neutrality in judicial decision making).
2. See Bork, supra note 1, at 12 ("cases cannot be reconciled on any basis other than the Justices'
personal beliefs"). Professor Wechsler recognized this, but insisted on neutral application of whatever
principles judges select as rules of decision. -Wechsler, supra note 1, at 14-15. Other commentators, how-
ever, have focused on the dubious desirability or feasibility of the neutral-principle mode of decision mak-
ing itself. See, eg., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204,
205-24 (1980) ("we are hopelessly imprisoned in our own world views"); Ely, Constitutional Interpretiv-
ism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 412-48 (1978) ("If a principled approach ... cannot
be developed ... the courts should stay away"); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. RIv. 781, 804-24 (1983) (asserting that neutral-princi-
ple theory can constrain judicial choices only on basis of presumed shared understandings); Wright, Pro-
fessor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L. REv. 769, 775-83 (1971)
(suggesting that requirements of principled decision making fatally unrealistic).
The principle of equality, which tends to be the starting point for much legal analysis of discrimination
problems, has recently come under heavy attack. See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 537 (1982) (suggesting that concept of equality is devoid of meaning and can acquire meaning only
through reference to normative theories of substantive rights). For reactions to the Westen thesis, see
Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REv. 575, 576 (1983)
(arguing that concept of equality is morally, analytically, and rhetorically necessary); D'Amato, Is Equal-
ity a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REv. 600, 603 (1983) (arguing that Westen's theory presupposes
concept of equality to provide point of comparison of substantive rights); Greenawalt, How Empty is the
Idea of Equality, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1169 (1983) (suggesting that concept of equality is coherent
and best conveyed by language of equality). For Professor Westen's reply, see Westen, The Meaning of
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been directed at the question of how to reconcile our continuing desire for neu-
tral objectivity with the seemingly inevitable influence of subjective values on
legal analysis.3 Generally, the starting assumption appears to be that the system,
although flawed, is conceptually sound and can be improved through various
proposed refinements, usually by uniting legal doctrine with one or another
school of social science or moral philosophy.4 More recent commentary, how-
ever, has begun to question the concept of principled decision making itself.5
Viewed from at least one perspective, the nature of principled decision making is
such that legal decisions can be made only through recourse to the very subjec-
tive values against which legal doctrine is designed to guard. My thesis is that
no matter how elaborate we make our legal rules, judges are necessarily doing
the same thing that they would do if we told them nothing more specific than to
prevent unjust discrimination.
If there is an area in which judicial bias is particularly inappropriate, it is in
dealing with the problem of discrimination. This article, however, examines a
recent Supreme Court race discrimination case in order to demonstrate how the
subjective values that might initially determine one's view of the case continue to
control even when one undertakes a rigorous doctrinal analysis. Part One ana-
lyzes each of the major legal issues presented by the case and evaluates the de-
gree to which the Justices' opinions appear to stem from subjective preferences,
rather than any principles that the opinions purport to apply. Part Two then
considers whether doctrine serves any useful purpose at all, or whether our
judges would be better advised merely to go forth and dispense simple justice.
Equality in Law, Science, Math and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604, 663 (1983) ("language of
equality adds nothing of substance to the right that underlies it").
3. The most recent effort I have seen is Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
445 (1984), which discusses many of the more established efforts.
4. Economics currently appears to be the most popular social science. See, e.g., A.M. POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed.
1977), but rights-based, nonutilitarian theories of moral philosophy also seem to be very appealing. See,
eg., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1970). A fascinating recent marriage is
that between law and literature, which appears to shift emphasis from the substantive content of law to
the manner in which legal texts acquire meaning. See generally Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 373 (1982); Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk
About Objectivity Any More, in THE POLrICS OF INTERPRETATION 287 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983); Fish,
Wrong Again, 62 TEX. L. REv. 299 (1983).
5. Distrust of principled decision making is the legacy of the legal realists. See In re J.P. Linahan, Inc,,
138 F.2d 650, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.) (arguing that prejudices and preconceptions shared by
society, as well as idiosyncratic sympathies of judges, find expression in society's legal system); J. FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xiii, 115 (6th ed. 1963) (arguing that judges' temperament, training,
biases, and predilections influence decisions); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECID-
ING APPEALS 3-4, 11-18, 393 (1960) (arguing that human psychology, particular circumstances, and in-
herent probabilities create nonuniform pattern of decisions); cf. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U.
PA. L. REv. 429, 435-38 (1934) (recognizing that judges often decide cases on policy grounds, then
"wring" from legal doctrine legally acceptable basis for decision). Some current commentators, however,
are prepared to carry realist perceptions to their logical extreme and concede total indeterminacy with
respect to both strict legal doctrine and any underlying policy justifications that might be offered for
particular applications of legal rules. See generally Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From
Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670-76 (1982). There are many
examples, but it is probably easiest to get the bittersweet flavor of what is going on from Kelman, Trash-




In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,6 a Title VII class action alleging
race discrimination in municipal employment, the Supreme Court held that an
employer confronting an economic recession could lay off employees on the basis
of seniority, notwithstanding the adverse effect that such layoffs would have on
an affirmative action plan to which the employer had committed itself by signing
a consent decree. Although the technical holding of the case may be quite nar-
row, the case has been read to stand for the proposition that Title VII prohibits
affirmative action initiatives that interfere with bona fide seniority plans, 7 and
even for the broader proposition that affirmative action itself is now prohibited.8
In fact, the case has been characterized as "the most important civil rights ruling
of the decade." 9 Moreover, it is likely that the Court not only foresaw the
broader significance that would be attached to its ruling, but that the Court even
intended it. 10 The Court's opinion reads as if it followed logically from the lan-
guage of Title VII and from prior Supreme Court decisions construing that stat-
ute-as if the Court had been led passively to its conclusion by prevailing
doctrinal considerations, rather than actively choosing to rule the way it did.
But the doctrinal guidance that the statute and precedents provide is so impre-
cise that, realistically, it is difficult to view the decision as anything other than an
expression of the subjective values of the Justices.
A. FACTS OF STOTTS
In 1977, Carl Stotts, a black firefighter employed by the municipal fire depart-
ment in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a class action against the City alleging that it
had engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in the hiring and
6. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
7. See, eg., A Right Turn on Race, NEWSWEEK, June 25, 1984, at 29-31; MuchAdo About a Shift to the
Right, TIME, June 25, 1984, at 63-64; Cohen, Reverse Quotas, Wash. Post, June 17, 1984, at D7, col. 1;
Kraft, Going Too Far?, Wash. Post, June 17, 1984, at D7, col. 1; Will, It Calls a Bluff, Wash. Post, June
17, 1984, at D7, col. 1; Jones, They've Turned Their Backs on Us, USA Today, June 14, 1984, at 10A, col.
2; Decision Could Hurt Civil Rights Progress, USA Today, June 14, 1984, at 10A, col. 1; Firemen's Senior-
ity, Wash. Post, June 14, 1984, at A22, col. 1; Quotelines, USA Today, June 14, 1984, at 10A, col. 1; The
Court Strains to Make Work, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1984, at A22, col. 1; Voices From Across the USA, USA
Today, June 14, 1984, at 10A, col. 1; Court Trims Back, USA Today, June 13, 1984, at IA, col. 2; Critics
Say Integration Hurt by Seniority Ruling, USA Today, June 13, 1984, at 3A, col. 2; High Court Rules for
Seniority, Not Affirmative Action, Wash. Post, June 13, 1984, at A17, col. 5; Reaction is Mixed on Court
Decision, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1984, at B12, col. 4; Seniority is Held to Outweigh Race as a Layoff Guide,
N.Y. Times, June 13, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
8. The Reagan Administration and others have offered broad interpretations of the decision. See, eg.,
A Right Turn on Race, supra note 7; Much Ado About a Shift to the Right, supra note 7; Abram, Decision
Helps Restore Civil Rights for Us All, USA Today, June 14, 1984, at 10A, col. 5; Harris, For Minorities to
Win, a Few Others Must Lose, USA Today, June 14, 1984, at 10A, col. 5; Affirmative Action Ruling
Pleases Firms, Angers Minorities, Women, Wall St. J., June 14, 1984, at 33, col. 3; Civil Rights, Wash.
Times, June 14, 1984, at 11A, col. 1; Justice Dept Declares Win Over Quotas, Wash. Post, June 14, 1984, at
A], col. 1; High Court Dumps Quotas in Labor Case, Wash. Times, June 13, 1984, at IA, col. 2; Justices
Limit Affirmative Action Plans When Seniority of Other Workers Affected, Wall St. J., June 13, 1984, at 2,
col. 3; cf Fair Housing Law Questioned, Wash. Post, July 11, 1984, at Al, col. 2 (Justice Department
challenges use of quotas to maintain integration in housing project).
9. Will, supra note 7.
10. Justice White, the author of the majority opinion, is hardly naive. In this regard, see Lewin,
White's Flight, THE NEW REPUBLIc, Aug. 27, 1984, at 17-20 (suggesting that Justice White has adopted
more conservative leadership role).
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promotion of firefighters." The suit was not the first discrimination case that
had been filed against the City of Memphis. In fact, three years earlier, in 1974,
the United States Department of Justice had filed suit against the City alleging
both race and gender discrimination violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The
Justice Department suit encompassed hiring and promotions in the City's fire
department as well as in its other employment divisions. 12
When the Justice Department suit was filed, the statistical discrepancies in the
City's hiring and promotion practices were striking. Although in 1974, the City
of Memphis was approximately 35% black, 13 only 4% of its firefighters were
black. 14 Between 1950 and 1976, two years after the Justice Department filed
suit, the Memphis Fire Department hired 94 black firefighters and 1683 white
firefighters.' 5 The statistics relating to promotions were similar. Between 1969
and 1974, the Memphis Fire Department promoted 371 whites and only 7
blacks.' 6 In 1975, the year after the Justice Department suit was filed, the City's
promotion practices still had not improved. That year, the City promoted 15
white firefighters but no blacks. 17
The Justice Department suit was never adjudicated. Rather, the Attorney
General and the City of Memphis settled the case by entering into a consent
decree later in 1974. In the decree, the City denied having engaged in race or
gender discrimination but admitted that its past practices could give rise to an
inference of such discrimination. The stated purposes of the decree were to pro-
hibit prospective discrimination on the basis of race or gender and to remedy
through long-term hiring goals the effects of what the decree referred to as past
discrimination. '8
Over the course of the next several years, black firefighters remained dissatis-
fied with the City's progress 19 and eventually began to take additional legal ac-
tions. In February 1977, Carl Stotts filed his suit, which, like the prior Justice
Department suit, alleged both Title VII and constitutional violations arising out
of the Fire Department's hiring and promotion practices. In addition, a minor-
ity firefighter's group moved to intervene in the Stotts suit. Although the trial
court denied that motion, it did certify the Stotts suit as a class action.20 The suit
11. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2581 (1984).
12. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 546-47 (6th Cir. 1982).
13. Id. at 550 n.5.
14. 104 S. Ct. at 2582.
15. 679 F.2d at 550 n.5.
16. Id.
17. Id The court of appeals never explains why the statistics that it cites do not cover precisely the
same time period, but there seems to be no dispute whatsoever concerning the broad scope of the City's
racially disparate employment practices prior to initiation of the Justice Department suit.
18. Under the terms of the decree, the City agreed to the long-term goal of hiring enough minorities
and women in each job classification to reflect the proportional representation of minorities and women in
the local civilian work force. The City also agreed to engage in affirmative recruitment efforts in order to
meet those goals. With respect to blacks, the decree required, as an interim hiring goal, that 50% of all
vacancies be filled by qualified black applicants. The decree also authorized the imposition of more spe-
cific numerical ratios and quotas for both hiring and promotion if the City's voluntary efforts failed to
provide adequate progress in meeting the long-term goals embodied in the decree. Id. at 547, 570-72 app.
19. By 1980, the percentage of blacks in the Fire Department had grown from 4 to 11%, 104 S. Ct. at
2582, but it was still less than one-third of the 35% long-term goal that the 1974 consent decree had
established. But see id. (between 1974 and 1977, 56% of firefighters hired were black).
20. 679 F.2d at 547.
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generated extensive press coverage, and discovery proceeded for the next two
years. Then, in 1979, a second suit was filed against the City by a black
firefighter, alleging racial discrimination in the denial of his application for a
promotion. That suit, Jones v. Memphis Fire Department, was consolidated with
the Stotts case. Discovery continued, and on April 25, 1980, the consolidated
Stotts cases were also settled with a consent decree.
21
The explicit purpose of the 1980 Stotts decree was to "parallel and supple-
ment" the relief provided by the 1974 Justice Department decree. 22 Again, the
City denied any legal liability, but again the decree stated that its purpose was to
remedy the effects of the City's past employment practices.23 The decree also
prescribed a procedure by which the parties could seek to resolve any ambigui-
ties or remedy any unintended consequences produced by the decree, and the
court specifically retained jurisdiction to settle disputes regarding such matters
that the parties were not themselves able to resolve.24 Then the problem arose.
In May 1981, the City announced that it was facing a deficit in its projected
operating budget and, for the first time in its modem history, would lay off mu-
nicipal employees in all divisions of the City government, including the Fire De-
partment. The layoffs were to be based on citywide union seniority, calculated in
the manner prescribed by the 1974 Justice Department decree, with the most
recently hired employees to be laid off first. In addition, senior employees who
were otherwise to be laid off were given the right to "bump" less senior employ-
ees in lower job classifications. As a result, the City's announced layoffs were to
produce rank reductions in higher job categories and actual loss of jobs in lower
categories. 25
Because blacks, whom the City hired and promoted primarily under the con-
sent decrees, tended to have less seniority than whites, whom the City had his-
torically favored in making hiring and promotion decisions, the seniority-based
layoff program would have adversely affected black firefighters by eroding gains
that they had made under the consent decrees. Approximately sixty percent of
the firefighters who would have been affected by the City's layoff program were
black. As a result, the plantiffs in Stotts sought to enjoin the City from imple-
menting the layoffs in a manner that would adversely affect black firefighters to
the degree contemplated by the layoff program. The trial court first issued a
temporary restraining order. Then, after a hearing in which the firefighters'
union was permitted to intervene, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction
21. Id. at 547-48.
22. Id. at 548.
23. The long-term goals of the 1974 decree were once again adopted, as was the 50% interim goal for
hiring. This time, however, an interim goal was also established with respect to promotions. Until the
long-term goal of proportional representation of blacks in each job classification had been attained, the
City agreed that qualified blacks would receive at least 20% of the promotions made at each classification
level. In addition, the City specifically agreed to promote certain individual firefighters and to provide a
total of $60,000 in back-pay awards to various class members. Id. at 548, 573-76.
24. Id. at 578. After the parties had agreed to the terms of the consent decree, the decree was posted in
Memphis fire stations for a 15-day comment period. Neither the firefighters' union nor any members of
the class objected to the decree. Eleven nonminority firefighters, however, acting independently from the
union, did object and moved to intervene in the Stotts case for the purpose of suggesting alternative
remedies that would have a less adverse impact on nonminority firefighters. After a hearing, the court
denied the motion to intervene, rejected the alternative remedies, and approved the consent decree. Id at
548-49.
25. See id. at 549-51.
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prohibiting the City from conducting layoffs based on seniority, to the extent
that such layoffs would decrease the percentage of black firefighters in the perti-
nent job categories. The court found that the layoffs and demotions resulted
from an unanticipated change in circumstances that had not been provided for
by the text of the Stotts decree, that seniority-based layoffs would have a discrim-
inatory impact on blacks, and that the seniority system was not bona fide. 26
In response to the injunction, the City developed and implemented a modified
layoff program that did not reduce the percentages of black firefighters. 27 Ulti-
mately, the City laid off twenty-four firefighters, three of whom were black. If
the original seniority-based layoff program had been implemented, a total of six
blacks would have been laid off and three additional whites would have retained
their jobs. The record does not indicate how the preliminary injunction affected
the demotions caused by the City's layoff program.28 The layoffs turned out to
be short-lived. All laid-off or demoted firefighters were offered restoration of
their jobs and ranks within one month after the layoff program commenced.29
In addition, because the City had hired all of the affected firefighters on the same
day, the layoffs called for under both the original and modified programs were
actually determined alphabetically rather than on the basis of seniority.30
The City and the firefighters' union appealed the district court's preliminary
injunction, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 31 The court
of appeals held that the consent decree had been properly approved and that the
district court had properly issued a preliminary injunction to prevent that decree
from being undermined. The court of appeals further held that the district court
had the authority under three alternative theories to modify the decree in a way
that would bar seniority-based layoffs. First, under contract principles, the de-
cree itself contemplated any modifications that might be necessary in light of
changed circumstances. Second, rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure authorized modification in order to prevent the decree from producing
harsh consequences. Finally, the court's traditional equity powers gave the
court continuing jurisdiction to modify the decree in light of changed circum-
stances.3 2 The court of appeals also held that even though the district court had
erred in ruling that the City's seniority plan was not a bona fide plan, the provi-
sion of Title VII that specifically protects bona fide seniority plans did not apply
in a way that prohibited modification of the consent decree.33
The Supreme Court granted certiorari34 and reversed the two lower courts.35
26. Id
27. 104 S. CL at 2582.
28. Id. at 2582 n.2.
29. Id. at 2583.
30. Brief for Respondents at 24, app. D1-D2, Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct.
2576 (1984). The City's seniority plan provided that layoff determinations between employees with equal
seniority and comparable personnel records were to be made in reverse alphabetical order. Id. at 24, 82-
84. Although demotions were also covered by the City's seniority plan, Joint Appendix at 85, Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), the question with respect to which certiorari was
granted appears to have been limited to layoffs, Brief for Respondents, supra, at 15 n.15, and the record
seems not to have contained clear information about the effect that the trial court's preliminary injunction
had on demotions. 104 S. Ct. at 2582 n.2.
31. 679 F.2d 541.
32. Id. at 560-61.
33. Id. at 564-67.
34. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983).
35. 104 S. Ct. at 2581.
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Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court for a five-person majority.
Although Justice O'Connor signed the majority opinion, she wrote a separate
concurrence explaining her interpretation of the Court's action. Justice Stevens
wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment but did not sign the major-
ity opinion. Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall also signed. Thus, the Court ruled 6-3 to set aside the trial
court's preliminary injunction.
B. HOLDINGS OF STOITS
The Stotts case presented two major issues. The first was whether the case was
moot because the City offered to restore all jobs and rank within one month after
the City implemented its layoff program-well before the case was presented to
the Supreme Court for review. The second issue concerned the merits of the case
and can be broken down into two subissues: whether the consent decree pre-
cluded seniority-based layoffs; and, if not, whether Title VII permitted modifica-
tion of the decree so that it would preclude such layoffs. The Supreme Court
resolved these issues in certain ways, but each issue could just as easily have been
resolved the opposite way without any additional strain on the governing prece-
dents or doctrinal rules.
1. Mootness
When the City of Memphis offered to restore the jobs and ranks of all firefight-
ers who had been affected by the City's layoff program within a month after that
program had taken effect, the Stotts case may well have become moot. In fact, a
year before the Supreme Court decided Stotts, the Court vacated the judgment in
a strikingly similar action, when the rehiring of laid-off municipal employees
suggested that the case had become moot.36 The doctrine of mootness is one of
the justiciability doctrines rooted in the article III case or controversy provision
that limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to the resolution of live, ongoing
legal disputes between the parties. According to conventional wisdom, jus-
ticiability restrictions preclude the adjudication of disputes that have expired or
not yet become sufficiently immediate to warrant judicial resolution. If a federal
court were to address the legal questions presented in a case that had become
moot, it would be exceeding the proper scope of the judicial function and issuing
a constitutionally prohibited advisory opinion. As a strict doctrinal matter,
therefore, the Supreme Court did not possess article III jurisdiction to resolve
the Stotts appeal unless a live controversy continued to exist at the time that the
Supreme Court decided the case.
3 7
The Court's Analysis. Justice White's majority opinion holds that,
although the laid-off firefighters had been offered the return of their jobs and
36. See Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 461 U.S. 477 (1983).
37. See 104 S. Ct. at 2596 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) and cases cited therein; see also City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (no case or controversy where individual sought injunction
against use by police of choke holds because no real and immediate threat of choke hold use on claimant).
For a discussion of, inter alia, mootness and its relationship to the article III case or controversy require-
ment, see Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. Rxv. 585, 617-32 (1983).
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ranks, a controversy continued to exist because the trial court's preliminary in-
junction continued to prohibit the City of Memphis from implementing senior-
ity-based layoffs if it should wish to do so in the future. 38 The most striking
aspect of this holding is its circularity. The Court holds that the preliminary
injunction had continuing effects because it had not been reversed or vacated.
As the Court had previously held in United States v. Munsingwear,39 however:
The established practice of the [Supreme] Court in dealing with a civil
case from a court in the federal system which has become moot while
on its way here or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or
vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.4°
Accordingly, if the case had been dismissed as moot, the trial court's preliminary
injunction would have been vacated, thereby depriving the case of precisely those
continuing effects that the majority relied on to avoid a finding of mootness.
Justice White certainly must have been aware of the cases, dating back to at least
1896, that call for vacation of the judgment below after a finding of mootness.41
And even if he was not, those cases are emphatically called to his attention by
both Justice Blackmun's dissent 42 and Justice O'Connor's concurrence.43 Ac-
cordingly, this portion of the majority's mootness discussion is mysteriously
inapposite.
A slightly more serious argument offered by Justice White in support of the
Court's mootness holding is that the case continued to present a live controversy
because laid-off firefighters might possess claims for back pay and lost seniority
resulting from their layoffs. 44 Again, however, the defects in this argument are
readily apparent. As the dissent points out, the Stotts case simply does not in-
volve any claims for back pay or lost seniority,45 and the mere possibility that
firefighters would raise such claims in the future is normally insufficient to keep
an otherwise moot action alive. And again, it is unlikely that Justice White over-
looked this observation. Not only is it called to his attention by the dissent, 46 but
38. 104 S. Ct. at 2583-84.
39. 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
40. Id. at 39 (footnote citing 32 cases in support of this proposition omitted).
41. See New Orleans Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 161 U.S. 101, 103 (1896) (vacating injunction against
enforcement of repealed law).
42. 104 S. Ct. at 2596 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 2591 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 2584.
45. Id at 2597-98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). With an amusing sleight of hand, the dissent goes on to
argue that the case not only fails to involve any claim for back pay or lost seniority, but that it could not
involve such claims. The adversary parties to such a suit would have to be the union, representing its
members who wished to assert such claims, and the City, seeking to resist those claims. Because the union
and the City were on the same side of the case in Stotts, they did not possess the adversity necessary to
permit adjudication of the back-pay and lost seniority issues. Id. at 2598 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Presumably, Justice Blackmun was making oblique reference to those justiciability cases that require ad-
versity for the existence of article III jurisdiction. See, ag., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
101-05 (1983) and cases cited therein (adversity needed to sharpen presentation of constitutional issues).
Although clever, the argument adds nothing to Justice Blackmun's initial observation that the Stotts case
simply did not involve the issues of back pay or lost seniority. If the parties had wished to include such
claims, it would have been a simple matter to add a cross-claim on the part of the union against the City.
Indeed, if such a claim had been filed in a separate action, that action might well have been consolidated
with Stotts, in light of the similarity of the operative legal issues, just as the Jones case was consolidated
with Stotts in the present action.
46. 104 S. Ct. at 2597-99 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Justice White himself cites cases in which the presence or absence of a back-pay
claim in the case before the court was dispositive of the mootness issue.4 7
One other aspect of the majority's resolution of the mootness issue is puzzling.
Two years before the Supreme Court decided Stotts, the Court granted certiorari
in Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP. 4 8 That case
also involved a conflict between the City's affirmative action obligations under a
consent decree and its obligations under a seniority-based layoff program imple-
mented by the City in response to a fiscal crisis, the precise conflict presented in
Stotts. The trial court had modified the pertinent consent decrees and issued a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the City from implementing its seniority-
based layoff program in a manner that would reduce the percentages of minority
workers employed in the police and fire departments.4 9 The court of appeals had
affirmed the trial court's ruling.50 Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court did
not resolve the merits, but chose rather to vacate the judgment below when re-
hiring of the laid-off municipal workers suggested that the case had become
moot.51 The puzzling thing is that, despite the striking similarity between the
cases, the Court does not even mention the Boston Firefighters case in discussing
the mootness issue in Stotts. It is as if the precedent most closely on point did
not exist.52
Justice Stevens did not sign the majority opinion in Stotts, but he did concur in
the Court's conclusion that the case was not moot.5 3 In a brief discussion, Jus-
47. Justice White cites Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), for the proposition that a back-pay
claim can preclude a finding of mootness. See 104 S. Ct. at 2584. Powell v. McCormack, however, unlike
Stotts, involved a claim for back pay. See 395 U.S. at 494. Moreover, the opinion in Powell v. McCor-
mack, which Justice White signed, expressly distinguished Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U.S. 528, 533-34
(1926), as a case that had become moot, precisely because it did not contain a back-pay claim, even
though such a claim could have been asserted. See 395 U.S. at 497-98. Accordingly, it is Alejandrino v.
Quezon, not Powell v. McCormack, that appears to control the mootness issue in Stotts.
48. 459 U.S. 967 (1982).
49. Castro v. Beecher, 522 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mass. 1981).
50. Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982).
51. 461 U.S. 477 (1983). The Supreme Court did not actually hold that the case was moot. Instead, it
vacated and remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of mootness in light of the rehirings, and
the court of appeals then held the case moot. Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 716 F.2d 931 (1st Cir.
1983). Although mootness seemed clear enough at the time that the court of appeals rendered its decision
on remand, the Supreme Court's decision in Stotts, of course, made matters much more ambiguous. In
apparent recognition of this ambiguity, the Supreme Court granted a second petition for certiorari in the
Boston Firefighters case and once again vacated the judgment below with another remand for reconsidera-
tion of mootness, this time in light of its decision in Stotts. See Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v.
Boston Chapter, NAACP, 104 S. Ct. 3576 (1984). Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens, wrote an opinion dissenting from the grant of certiorari. Justice Marshall did not participate in
the decision.
52. Indeed, even the dissent fails to cite the case. Some have suggested that the difference between
Boston Firefighters and Stotts is that in Boston Firefighters the layoff problem would not recur because the
state legislature had enacted a statute prohibiting future layoffs of firefighters and police officers for fiscal
reasons. See, e.g., Petitioners' Joint Opposition to Respondents' Suggestion of Mootness at 1-2, 4, 6,
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984); cf. Boston Firefighters, 104 S. Ct. at
3576 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from second grant of certiorari) (arguing that portions of Stotts relevant to
mootness issue in Boston Firefighters demonstrably wrong). This distinction, however, is not adequate.
When the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in the Boston Firefighters case, the state statute granting
the layoff protection was to expire in 45 days-a fact of which the Supreme Court was aware. 461 U.S. at
478. Thus, future layoffs were just as likely to occur in Boston as they were to occur in Memphis, the city
involved in Stotts. Moreover, even if this were a viable distinction between the two cases with respect to
mootness, it is certainly a distinction that one would have expected the Court to discuss, rather than
tacitly assume.
53. 104 S. Ct. at 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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tice Stevens simply asserts that the case was not moot because, in the future, the
City might again face the need to lay off firefighters, thereby giving it a continu-
ing interest in resolution of the issue presented in Stotts.54 Such a generalized
interest, however, is typically viewed as insufficient to ward off a finding of moot-
ness, 55 making it difficult to understand why Justice Stevens would offer this
doctrinally tenuous assertion without any elaboration.
Justice Stevens' only justification for his resolution of the mootness issue con-
sists of a footnote reference to two cases involving recognized exceptions to the
rule that federal courts lack jurisdiction to resolve moot cases. 56 One of these
cases, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 57 relates to the exception created for situa-
tions in which the defendant causes the case to become moot by voluntarily, but
only temporarily, ceasing to engage in the allegedly illegal activity of which the
plaintiff complains, thereby frustrating the plaintiff's efforts to have his or her
claim adjudicated. 58 That exception would appear to be inapplicable in Stotts
because the City of Memphis appears to have permanently, rather than tempo-
rarily, rehired the laid-off workers and the City was certainly not motivated by
any desire to preclude judicial review. Far from seeking to escape review, the
City wished to avoid a finding of mootness precisely so that the Supreme Court
would resolve the merits of its appeal.
The other case cited by Justice Stevens, Carroll v. Princess Anne,59 relates to
the exception created for issues that are capable of repetition yet evade review,
that is, issues that tend to be inherently short-lived but, nevertheless, recur with
enough frequency to warrant review despite their mootness.60 Again, however,
it is difficult to conclude that the issues surrounding the trial court's modification
of the consent decree will evade review, because they can so easily be tested in an
action to recover back pay or lost seniority. 61
Of those who thought that the Court should reach the merits, only Justice
O'Connor makes any serious effort to deal with the issue of mootness. Unlike
Justices White and Stevens, Justice O'Connor at least recognizes that Munsing-
wear exists and would cause the lower court judgment to be vacated if the case
were found to be moot. She, however, believes that collateral consequences of
the trial court's preliminary injunction would continue to exist even if the injunc-
54. Id.
55. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-05 (1983) and cases cited therein (discussing
need for real and immediate threat of repeated injury in order to escape finding of mootness).
56. 104 S. Ct. at 2594 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
58. Id. at 109. The "voluntary cessation" exception is discussed more fully in United States v. W.T.
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953).
59. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
60. Id. at 178-79. The "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception is discussed more fully in
Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-15 (1911).
61. As if to enhance the mystery surrounding the Court's actions with respect to mootness, Justice
Stevens chose to dissent from the Court's second grant of certiorari in the Boston Firefighters case. See
supra note 51. If Justice Stevens believed that the Stotts case could withstand a mootness challenge,
presumably he thought that the factually indistinguishable Boston Firefighters case could withstand such a
challenge as well. Nevertheless, his treatment of the two cases is inconsistent. The court of appeals,
having failed to anticipate the mootness message of Stotts, held Boston Firefighters to be moot. Although
Justice Stevens presumably disagreed with that result, as evidenced by his opinion in Stotts explicitly
stating that the case was not moot, he nevertheless voted to deny certiorari in Boston Firefighters rather
than correct the court of appeals' "erroneous" finding of mootness.
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tion were vacated, and that those consequences fit the case into a third mootness
exception.62 The "collateral consequences" exception to which Justice O'Connor
refers is not really an "exception" at all. Rather, it merely authorizes review
when incidental effects of the defendant's conduct prevent the case from becom-
ing moot even though the primary effect of that conduct has terminated.63 The
collateral consequences that Justice O'Connor cites as sufficient to give the case
continuing vitality arise from the one-month enhanced seniority that blacks who
were not laid off or demoted gained over whites who were. That enhanced sen-
iority might enable the black firefighters to compete better with the white
firefighters for promotions, job transfers, and protection from future layoffs64 -
but then again it might not. And that is the problem with Justice O'Connor's
argument.
Although Justice O'Connor may well have articulated a continuing conse-
quence of the trial court's preliminary injunction that was sufficient to overcome
mootness problems, she does so only at the expense of creating ripeness
problems. Like mootness, ripeness is rooted in the article III case or controversy
restriction on federal court jurisdiction. It precludes the adjudication of cases in
which the threatened harm that the court is asked to prevent is too remote or
speculative to warrant judicial intervention.65
The threatened harm that Justice O'Connor cites seems to fall into this cate-
gory of speculative danger because it is so contingent. The harm will be suffered
only: if the City of Memphis decides to exclude the one-month layoff period from
the seniority calculations for affected white firefighters under the particular cir-
cumstances involved in this case; and if a seniority contest happens to arise that
involves one of the few firefighters affected by the layoffs; and if the relatively
short, one-month seniority period at issue happens to determine the outcome of
that seniority contest; and if the adversely affected firefighter cares enough about
whatever loss results to undertake the expense and inconvenience of litigation in
the hope of obtaining a remedy for that harm. Ripeness doctrine is specifically
designed to prevent the adjudication of such speculative cases until they actually
arise. Moreover, contingencies less attenuated than the one Justice O'Connor
describes have been held to preclude adjudication on ripeness grounds.66 There-
fore, even if Justice O'Connor were correct that the case is not moot, the Court
would apparently still lack jurisdiction because the case would not be ripe.
Doctrinal Play. One might conclude from the foregoing discussion that,
far from being ambiguous, mootness doctrine is quite precise and determinate;
the Stotts majority is simply wrong, and the dissent is correct that the case is
moot. But that would understate the problem illustrated by the mootness issue
in Stotts. The problem stems from the fact that the dissent is no more correct
62. See 104 S. Ct. at 2591-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. The "collateral consequences" exception is discussed more fully in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 53-5 8 (1968) (collateral legal consequences of conviction mean case not moot, although full sentence
served).
64. See 104 S. Ct. at 2591 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-05 (1983) and cases cited therein (discussing
ripeness doctrine).
66. See id. and cases discussed therein (arguing that ripeness doctrine demands real and immediate
threat of harm).
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than the majority is. There is enough play in the doctrine of mootness to permit
either result.
It is easy to imagine the mootness issue being resolved in the manner advo-
cated by the dissent. Such a resolution would have been consistent with tradi-
tional mootness doctrine, and would have corresponded to the way that the
court of appeals decided the virtually identical issue in Boston Firefighters.67 It is
also easy, however, to imagine the mootness issue being resolved in the manner
advocated by the majority-the way that it actually was resolved. Although the
majority opinion is itself unsatisfactorily glib, doctrinally more tenable justifica-
tions for the majority result are readily available.
In order to determine how a doctrine of law properly applies, it is generally
thought that the doctrinal rules should be construed in the way that best serves
the functions for which they were fashioned.68 As indicated above,69 mootness is
part of a complex of justiciability doctrines designed to serve the dual functions
of limiting courts to the resolution of cases and controversies and preventing
courts from issuing constitutionally offensive advisory opinions. The case or
controversy restriction ensures that the pertinent legal issues are presented to the
courts in an adversary context conducive to proper resolution of those issues,
while the advisory opinion prohibition ensures that the courts will not abrogate
constitutionally based separation of powers principles by "making" prospective
law, a legislative function, rather than applying law retrospectively to the facts of
a particular case.70
Once the functional objectives of mootness are considered, it becomes much
easier to understand how the majority could conclude that Stotts was not moot.
The case arose from a specific factual context in which the parties were suffi-
ciently motivated to present the issues with the requisite adversary clash. None
of that changed simply because the laid-off workers were rehired. The City's
continuing desire to clarify matters for potential back-pay claims or future lay-
offs provided the City with enough motivation to ensure vigorous advocacy, and
the plaintiffs' continuing desire to retain the benefits-both practical and sym-
bolic-of the trial court's ruling ensured vigorous adversary involvement by the
plaintiff class.71 Indeed, no one-not even the dissent-has ever suggested that
there was any lack of adversary vigor in the presentation of arguments to the
Supreme Court.
67. See supra notes 48 to 51 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between Stotts and Boston
Firefighters).
68. See, ag., H. HART & A. SAcKs, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BAsic PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 125-28, 162-68 (tent. ed. 1958) (public policy proper basis for application of legal
rules); Fuller, American LegalRealism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 431-38 (1934) (social concerns relevant to
application of legal doctrine); Laswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 203-06 (1943) (legal doctrines should be analyzed in
terms of policy); Spann, Functional Analysis of the Plain Error Rule, 71 GEO. L.J. 945, 979-82 (1983)
(legal analysis should identify function of doctrine and determine result best suited to that function).
69. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of justiciability restrictions).
70. The nature and functions of the various justiciability doctrines are discussed at greater length in
Spann, supra note 37, at 632-60.
71. The plaintiffs also stood to recover litigation costs and attorneys fees if they prevailed. Such a stake
in the outcome has been held sufficient to avoid a finding of mootness. See Deposit Guarantee Nat'l Bank
v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336-40 (1980) (class certification issue not moot, despite settlement of underlying
claim, because named plaintiffs retained interest in recovering litigation costs).
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Likewise, the nature and specificity of the legal issues involved in the case
precluded any serious danger that the Court would transcend its proper role
within our system of separated governmental powers. The issues were classic
judicial issues: ascertainment of the parties' intent with respect to the meaning of
the consent decree; and construction of a statute with respect to the court's au-
thority to modify the consent decree. Because such issues do not fall within
legislative or executive competence, the Court's retrospective resolution of those
issues posed very little risk of a separation of powers violation. Accordingly, a
functional rather than mechanistic, case-oriented approach to mootness suggests
that no useful purpose would have been served by dismissing the Stotts appeal
and leaving the merits unresolved.
Notwithstanding the cases cited by the dissent, the Supreme Court precedents
that have arguably been more sensitive to functional considerations have not let
technical problems prevent resolution of a seemingly moot case when common
sense and efficiency dictated a contrary result. The clearest example is provided
by the so-called "headless class action" cases. A headless class action is a suit,
pleaded as a class action, that has become moot as to the named plaintiff. In
several instances, however, the Supreme Court has permitted headless class ac-
tions to proceed despite the absence of any party who presented a live, ongoing
controversy. The Court has used a variety of theories to permit this result.
Sometimes it has relied on the fiction that the certified class itself constitutes the
plaintiff for whom a live controversy continues to exist.72 On other occasions,
when a class has not yet been certified and cannot therefore serve as the fictitious
plaintiff, the Court has relied on various exceptions to the mootness rule in order
to obviate the problems caused by the absence of an actual plaintiff.73 By far the
most revealing headless class action case, however, is United States Parole Com-
mission v. Geraghty,74 where the Supreme Court reviewed the denial of a class
certification motion made by a named plaintiff with respect to whom the case
had become moot. In Geraghty, there was no "live" plaintiff before the Court, no
certified class existed, and none of the traditional mootness exceptions applied.
Nevertheless, the Court found the doctrine of mootness to be "flexible" enough,
at least in the context of nontraditional forms of litigation such as class actions,
to permit the Court to resolve the appeal.
75
The headless class actions demonstrate that technical niceties about mootness
need not be dispositive. In each of those actions the context and adversary pres-
entation concerns underlying the mootness doctrine were adequately accommo-
dated, as were the separation of powers concerns that mootness also reflects.
The Court chose to adjudicate the merits in those cases despite theoretical moot-
ness problems. Accordingly, in Stotts-another "nontraditional" class action
72. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-403 (1975) (case challenging Iowa residency requirements for
divorce not moot when controversy exists between defendant and unnamed members of class, even though
named plaintiff's claim moot).
73. See, eg., Deposit Guarantee Nat'1 Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336-40 (1980) (case not moot when
named plaintiff continued to suffer collateral consequences, including inability to recover litigation costs);
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975) (case not moot when injury to named plaintiff capable of
repetition and evades review).
74. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
75. See id. at 402-04 ("The proposed representative retains a 'personal stake' in obtaining class certifi-
cation sufficient to assure that Art. III values are not undermined.").
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warranting "flexible" treatment, where mootness concerns would again appear
to pose only theoretical problems-there is no logical reason to dismiss the ap-
peal on mootness grounds.
The fact that a respectable argument can be made in support of the majority
holding does not, of course, mean that the majority is correct in its resolution of
the mootness issue. Rather, it demonstrates that proper resolution of the issue is
uncertain. It is almost always possible to deemphasize particular precedents, as
the majority does in Stotts, and to redefine the pertinent issue in terms of its
underlying functional objectives. Functional objectives, however, tend to be ab-
stract and general, offering little guidance for resolution of the issue. For exam-
ple, I have suggested7 6 that the rehiring of laid-off workers in Stotts did not
reduce the motivation of the parties enough to cause adversary presentation
problems. But it would have been just as easy to reach the opposite conclusion.
The rehiring, by definition, reduced the motivation of the defendants to some
degree; the entire law of mootness is premised upon this belief. If one views that
degree of lost motivation as enough to cause adversary presentation problems,
one must conclude that the case is moot after all. On a functional level, there-
fore, application of mootness doctrine is not much different from application of a
rule prohibiting unjust discrimination; the doctrinal guidance provided is too
sparse to be of much help.
One could argue that the ambiguity inherent in functional analysis shows why
it is important to adhere to close case analysis, as the dissent does, rather than be
distracted by functional considerations. Merely articulating such a proposition,
however, is enough to demonstrate its inadequacy. The precedents and the rules
that they contain are simply shorthand statements of our functional concerns.
Why would we care whether a case was followed or not, except to the extent that
it advanced our functional objectives? Indeed, given the fact that all cases are
both alike and different in an infinite number of ways, we cannot know which
similarities and differences are relevant without first determining whether they
have any bearing on our functional objectives. Bare case analysis is too artificial
to be convincing, but the introduction of functional considerations into the anal-
ysis makes almost any outcome possible.
How then does a judge resolve the legal issues presented in a case? In Stotts
the Justices probably resolved the mootness issue in the way they thought best
under the circumstances. The dissenters apparently viewed resolution of the
nagging conflict between seniority and affirmative action as too controversial and
divisive to warrant adjudication in the absence of any actual compulsion to ad-
dress the issue-at least if the merits were to be resolved in the way that the
majority wished to resolve them. The majority, however, appears to have viewed
the issue as one that had lingered undecided long enough, and accordingly chose
to provide guidance to lower courts and private parties by resolving it. It is
difficult to view these positions as anything other than subjective preferences of
the Justices who espoused them. Not only was mootness doctrine unable to pre-
vent those subjective preferences from entering the analysis, but the doctrine
itself rested upon ambiguities that could be resolved only through recourse to




those preferences. The subjective values of the Justices were, therefore, unavoid-
ably involved in the decision.77
2. The Merits
Little can be said with confidence about the Supreme Court's resolution of the
merits in Stotts, other than that it concerned the conflict between affirmative
action and seniority. Technically, the case appears to have two holdings. First, it
77. The conflicting preferences of the Justices with respect to addressing the merits in Stotts appear to
have controlled the outcome of another threshold issue besides mootness. Before the merits could be
reached, the Court had to determine the proper scope of its review over the lower court decision. The
dissent argued that the proper scope of review was governed by the abuse-of-discretion standard normally
applied to the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See 104 S. Ct. at 2596 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Under this standard, the ultimate question of whether an affirmative action decree could take precedence
over a seniority plan was not before the Court. Rather, the Court was merely presented with the question
of whether the trial court had abused its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction to preserve the
status quo regarding minority employment until the court could undertake a final resolution of the merits,
after the development of a full factual record. In support of its position, the dissent relied on University of
Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 393-98 (1981), which expressly states that the merits are not properly
before an appellate court reviewing the propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction. See 104 S. Ct. at
2600-02 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The majority did not quarrel with the dissent's interpretation of Camenisch. Instead, Justice White
chose to characterize the issue in a different way. He reasoned that the trial court's issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction in Stotts was based on that court's analytically prior determination that the 1980 consent
decree could be modified to supersede the seniority plan, and that the merits of that modification were
properly before the Court on appeal. See id. at 2585 n.8. Despite its superficial appeal, Justice White's
characterization is less than completely convincing. Camenisch holds that the underlying merits are not
before a court reviewing a mere preliminary injunction, because the haste that typically surrounds the
issuance of interlocutory injunctions makes the trial court's factual and legal determinations too tentative
to warrant review. It is only after the trial court has given the issues plenary consideration and chosen to
make the injunction permanent that appellate review of the merits is proper. 451 U.S. at 396-98. It
follows, therefore, that any subsidiary legal conclusions that the trial court made in the process of ruling
on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, including its conclusion about the propriety of
modifying the consent decree, were also interlocutory in nature and not within the scope of appellate
review under Camenisch.
Again, it is possible to formulate a more realistic argument in favor of reviewing the merits than the
argument relied on by the majority. The Supreme Court routinely decides some issues on appeal, notwith-
standing the fact that they are raised in a preliminary injunction hearing. Suppose, for example, that the
plaintiffs' standing had been an issue in Stotts. Few would argue that standing was beyond the scope of
Supreme Court review, even though the trial court's factual and legal determinations concerning standing
would have been subject to the very same dangers of haste as the other determinations made in the
expedited preliminary injunction proceeding. Accordingly, the Camenisch rule cannot be as cut-and-dry
as the dissent would have us believe. Rather, it must mean that appellate review is precluded only with
respect to those issues arising in a preliminary injunction proceeding that require fuller factual or legal
development by the trial court before the Supreme Court can safely resolve the issues. So stated,
Camenisch may well permit appellate review of the modification issue, as long as haste does not appear to
have generated an unreliable or inadequate record below. But again, this argument does little to guard
against bias. The argument simply shifts the focus to functional concerns, and once again, it becomes a
simple matter for each Justice to assert that the outcome corresponding to his or her subjective prefer-
ences is the proper outcome.
It is, of course, possible to accept the dissent's statement of the proper scope of review and nevertheless
reverse the lower court by finding that issuance of a preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion, as
Justice Stevens did, see 104 S. Ct. at 2595 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), or that the plaintiffs
were not sufficiently likely to prevail on the merits to warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction, as
Justice O'Connor did. See id. at 2594 (O'Connor, J., concurring). One could also conclude that the bal-
ance of the equities did not weigh in favor of issuing a preliminary injunction or that an injunction was not
in the public interest, as is required by the other preliminary injunction standards. See University of
Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 392 (1981) (discussing preliminary injunction standards); Doran v.
Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (discussing public interest standard). But those standards are also
broad ones that do little to control the outcome or deflect a judge's temptation to succumb to personal
preferences.
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holds that because the parties did not intend their consent decree to preclude
seniority-based layoffs, principles of contract law do not prohibit such layoffs.
Second, the case holds that Title VII bars modification of the decree in a way
that would prohibit such layoffs, because the plaintiffs did not make the showing
of intentional discrimination required for the type of relief being sought. The
problem is that ambiguities in what the Court views as adequate proof of inten-
tional discrimination make it difficult to ascertain the meaning of the decision.
As was true of mootness, however, the legal doctrines governing resolution of
the merits are not only too imprecise to provide effective insulation from judicial
bias, but the doctrines actually depend upon the subjective values of judges in
order to generate their results.
The Consent Decree. One theory that the court of appeals offered for
affirming the trial court's preliminary injunction was that the injunction was
needed to enforce the Stotts consent decree as a matter of contract law. When
the parties signed the decree, they agreed to settle their ongoing lawsuit in ac-
cordance with its terms. In addition to being a court order, therefore, the con-
sent decree was also a contract, like any other settlement agreement. As a result,
when the City announced its intention to lay off workers hired under the decree,
it committed an anticipatory repudiation of that contract, which made tradi-
tional contract remedies available to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the preliminary
injunction was simply a court order providing for specific performance of the
parties' contract, issued in accordance with customary contract principles.78
The Supreme Court rejected this contract-enforcement theory after finding
that the court of appeals had engaged in "improvident constructions" of the
Stotts consent decree.79 The Court emphasized that the decree nowhere stated an
intent to supersede seniority-based layoffs, that it expressly precluded any intent
to conflict with the earlier Justice Department decree, which specified a method
for calculating seniority,80 and that the City should not be deemed to have relin-
quished Title VII seniority protections for municipal employees, especially in an
action to which neither the union nor white workers were parties. As a result,
the Supreme Court concluded that the preliminary injunction did more than
merely enforce the agreement of the parties and could not, therefore, be justified
solely through recourse to contract principles.8
As a matter of contract law, the question of whether the consent decree pre-
cluded seniority-based layoffs ultimately turns on the intent of the parties. If the
parties were serious enough about their affirmative action objectives that they
intended to have affirmative action predominate over seniority concerns, the pre-
liminary injunction was justifiable. If the parties' intent was to subordinate af-
firmative action to seniority, however, the injunction was not warranted as a
contract remedy. It is difficult to feel comfortable with either conclusion about
the parties' intent because there is ample evidence supporting each.
78. See 679 F.2d at 561-62.
79. 104 S. Ct. at 2585.
80. The Justice Department decree, however, said nothing about using seniority to make layoff deter-
minations. Rather, it contemplated that seniority would be used for "purposes of promotion, transfer and
assignment." See 679 F.2d at 572 app.
81. See 104 S. Ct. at 2585-86.
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The court of appeals' conclusion, championed by Justice Blackmun in dis-
sent,82 has much intuitive appeal. Why would the plaintiffs, who filed suit pre-
cisely because the earlier Justice Department decree had been ineffective, ever
have entered into a second decree if that decree required them to relinquish those
few jobs that they had secured whenever the economy deteriorated enough to
produce layoffs? Why would blacks, traditionally thought to be among those
who suffer most as the economy worsens, agree to give up their jobs at the very
time when those jobs were most valuable? A construction of the consent decree
suggesting that this was the plaintiffs' intent is difficult to accept. A construction
under which affirmative action was intended to supersede seniority, however, is
easy to imagine. The plaintiffs would have desired such an agreement; the City,
which was the defendant, had nothing to lose by making such an agreement; and
white firefighters, the only group that might be adversely affected, never joined
the lawsuit and were not paries to the consent decree. 83
The conclusion reached by the majority is also quite supportable. The clearest
indication of the parties' intent in entering into a contract is the language that
they used. Here the language said nothing about supplanting seniority, the tradi-
tional method for making layoff determinations. Moreover, that omission takes
on even more significance when one recalls the degree of specificity that the de-
cree used in providing for hiring and promotion quotas, on both a long-term and
an interim basis.84 Moreover, the customary inclusion of seniority as a subject
for negotiation in Title VII decrees strongly suggests that the absence of an ex-
plicit retroactive seniority provision in the Stotts decree resulted from the plain-
tiffs' inability to secure the City's agreement to such a provision. When parties
choose to address and provide for hiring and promotions but make no provision
for firing-the third item in that natural trilogy- a court can easily conclude
that the parties chose not to alter normal practices with respect to the unad-
dressed item. To conclude otherwise would ignore the best available evidence of
the parties' intent and would involve the court in the questionable practice of
rewriting contracts.
As a formal matter, conclusions about the intent of the parties in Stotts can be
drawn either way, but the focus on intent is itself difficult to justify. What makes
contract litigation most interesting is that the parties, almost by definition, never
have any relevant intent. Either they anticipated the pertinent contingency and
82. See id. at 2603-04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83. This construction of the parties' intent assumes that the City had the power voluntarily to enter
into a consent decree adversely affecting the seniority of white firefighters. For Title VII purposes, the
Supreme Court seems to have authorized such voluntary action in United Steelworkers v. Weber, at least
where the decree would not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees," or run afoul of
other potential limitations. 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979). At least five members of the Court appear to
believe that Weber would have authorized a voluntary departure from the Memphis seniority plan. See
104 S. Ct. at 2595 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id at 2592-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id.
at 2605 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, with Brennan and Marshall, JJ.). However, the four other Justices,
who were in the majority, may have reservations. The majority opinion states, "Whether the City, a
public employer, could have taken this course without violating the law is an issue we need not decide."
Id. at 2590. This language may mean that the Justices in the majority are willing to rethink Weber; it may
mean that they view the applicable equal protection standard as more protective of the white "victims" of
affirmative action than is Title VII, but cf General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 132-40, 145 (1976)
(suggesting that Title VII and equal protection clause afford same protection against discrimination); or it
may mean nothing at all.
84. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing specific provisions of consent decree).
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provided for it in the terms of their contract, or they did not. If they did, there is
nothing to litigate; and if they did not, they failed to formulate any collective
intent to be ascertained. 85 In Stotts it is relatively clear that the parties did not
anticipate and jointly allocate the risk of municipal layoffs; if they had, the con-
sent decree would certainly have reflected the terms of their agreement. But
each of the courts that considered the issue, nevertheless, purported to draw
inferences about the intent of the parties. Because courts cannot ascertain a non-
existent intent, they must have been doing something else.
Possibly, the courts were trying to determine what the parties would have
agreed to if the parties had anticipated the layoff problem. It is unclear, how-
ever, why such an inquiry would be of any interest. Nominally, at least, courts
are limited to enforcing contracts that the parties actually make, not contracts
that the parties might have made. But, of course, courts frequently do intervene
to impose contract terms to which the parties themselves did not agree.86 In-
deed, the Stotts consent decree itself invited such judicial intervention by includ-
ing a provision for judicial resolution of unanticipated problems.87
Proper construction of the consent decree thus poses a doctrinally intractable
problem. The parties formulated no intent with respect to layoffs because they
did not anticipate them-or if anticipated, because they chose not to reach any
agreement with respect to layoffs. The parties, however, did formulate an intent
with respect to unanticipated problems: their intent was to have the court re-
solve them. But the way that the court resolves such problems is through re-
course to the intent of the parties.88 In construing the consent decree, therefore,
the Supreme Court was once again called upon to make legal determinations
with little operative doctrinal guidance. Arguably, the most sensible way to es-
cape this dilemma is through proper accommodation of the underlying concerns
that are at stake.
Stotts is a difficult case, because it forces us to choose between two interests
that are appealing yet conflicting. We want to remedy the effects of past discrim-
ination through affirmative action, but we also want to protect the seniority
rights earned by white workers. The customary way in which our contemporary
legal system deals with competing interests is through balancing. The conflicting
interests are identified, quantified, and compared, and the weightier interest
prevails. The process of interest balancing, however, entails so many uncon-
strained judicial determinations that the subjective values of the judge are neces-
sarily called into play on multiple occasions during the balancing process. 89
Before competing interests can be balanced they must be identified, and the
85. This analysis of intent illustrates a semantic paradox that lies at the core of the distinction between
the objective and subjective theories of contract. The problem is almost grappled with in Farnsworth,
"Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967).
86. Courts have even developed elaborate doctrinal rules relating to mistake, frustration, impracticabil-
ity, and impossibility in order to legitimize this practice. See generally E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
647-705 (1982). Those doctrines, however, are no more precise than the doctrines the Court discusses in
Stotts.
87. See 679 F.2d at 578 app.
88. Compare the phenomenon of analytical spin developed in Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative
Veto, 68 MiNN. L.R. 473, 516-27 (1984) ("When one of the terms in a formula for applying a principle is
the very principle to be applied, the formula prescribes no result and the principle does not control the
outcome.").
89. A thorough and systematic demonstration of the inability of interest balancing to constrain judicial
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judge's subjective perceptions of a case are likely to affect the identification pro-
cess. For example, it is not clear whether the consent decree in Stotts should be
viewed as primarily a contract-the way the majority viewed it-which would
then trigger our societal interest in preserving the autonomy of contracting par-
ties, or whether it should be viewed as primarily a court order-the way the
lower courts viewed it- which would trigger our societal interest in preserving
the integrity of judicial orders in light of changed circumstances. The way in
which the competing interests are identified will necessarily have an important
effect on the way in which the balance is struck. It is unlikely, however, that the
issue could be identified in any wholly objective manner. Rather, issue identifi-
cation tends to be a function of how the parties brief the case, how the press
covers it, what issues the judge understands well enough to feel comfortable ad-
judicating, and the like.
Once the competing interests are identified, they must be compared, but the
task can be a difficult one because many interests are noncommensurable.
Which, for example, is more important: an office building or a human life? The
two are qualitatively different and, therefore, hard to compare. We do compare
them, of course, because we build office buildings even though human lives are
lost in construction accidents. However, it is difficult to argue that any particu-
lar comparison is objectively correct. A frequent method of comparison is
through translation into a common standard of measure. Under this strategy,
selection of the unit of measure is likely to be very important, if not dispositive.
If dollars are used and an economic cost-benefit analysis is then conducted in
order to strike the balance, a large office building will almost certainly outweigh
a small number of lives lost in construction accidents. If, however, moral worth
is selected as the standard of measure, a single human life could easily outweigh
an entire city's worth of office buildings. Despite its importance, selection of the
proper standard of measure is hard to view as something that can be correct or
incorrect in any absolute sense. It is simply something about which reasonable
people will differ.
Assuming that a proper standard of measure can somehow be selected, each of
the competing interests must still be quantified in order to permit meaningful
comparison. The quantification process, however, is obviously riddled with sub-
jectivity. For the same reason that some people will pay hundreds of thousands
of dollars for a painting that other people would never permit to be hung on their
walls, some judges will give great weight to an interest that other judges will
consider to be relatively unimportant. Many interests, like our interests in sen-
iority and affirmative action, simply do not lend themselves to objective quantifi-
cation. The weight to be accorded such interests is likely to be a function of
things like the race, employment experience, economic status and political per-
suasion of the person doing the quantifying. Moreover, the quantification prob-
lem is further complicated by the fact that quantification must occur at some
level of generality, but selecting a level of generality is largely an arbitrary pro-
cess. For example, if a judge were to decide that Stotts involved our societal
interest in protecting seniority, the judge would then have to determine whether
decision making, from which the following analysis borrows heavily, is contained in Tushnet, Anti-For-
malism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MIcH. L. REv. (1985) (forthcoming).
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the importance of all seniority everywhere was to be considered in striking the
balance, or whether just the interests of the three white firefighters who had been
laid off for one month were pertinent. Again, it is difficult to view this as a
question with an objective answer.
Judges cannot balance interests without recourse to their subjective prefer-
ences. Even judges with the best intentions will balance competing interests ac-
cording to their views about both the relative importance of those interests and
the degree to which each interest will be advanced or frustrated by particular
outcomes in the case before the court. Because this activity is essentially uncon-
strained, however, it is difficult to see how a judge could possibly engage in it
without recourse to subjective values. When legal doctrine calls for interest bal-
ancing, therefore, it does something that is seemingly counterproductive. Be-
cause particular doctrinal applications are utterly dependent upon how the
balance is struck, the subjective preferences that doctrine is designed to guard
against necessarily drive application of the doctrinal rules. Once again, asking a
judge to balance competing interests is a lot like asking a judge to prevent unjust
discrimination.
Title VII Even if the parties did not "intend" for their consent decree
to preclude seniority-based layoffs, the trial court's injunction would, neverthe-
less, have been justified if issued to implement a proper modification of the de-
cree. Because a consent decree is not just a contract, but is a court order as well,
a court can modify such a decree by exercising its equity powers to effectuate the
basic purpose of the original decree in light of changed circumstances. 90 Like
the court of appeals, the dissent believes that the trial court properly modified
the decree to provide for the changed economic circumstances that produced
unprecedented municipal layoffs.91 Justice Stevens believes that modification of
the decree would have been proper under certain sets of facts, but that the actual
facts of Stotts did not demonstrate a sufficient change in circumstances to war-
rant modification. 92 The majority, however, held that regardless of whether
there had been a change in circumstances, Title VII precluded modification-
perhaps because of the special protections that Title VII accords seniority.93 Jus-
tice O'Connor agreed with the majority's conclusion, thereby providing the fifth
vote for the majority holding.94 In order to determine whether the majority's
holding is correct, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether Title VII per-
mits the Stotts consent decree to override the Memphis seniority plan.
Title VII, which was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 95 prohib-
90. See Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) (court extended effective date of
consent decree when parties intended decree's duration to depend on result of antitrust action against
competitor and that action delayed); cf Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 438-40
(1976) (court should modify school desegregation injunction to reflect changed demographics); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 251 (1968) (court should modify antitrust injunction
where basic purpose unfulfilled); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932) (court should
not modify antitrust injunction unless conditions significantly changed).
91. See 104 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92. See id at 2595 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
93. See id. at 2586-90.
94. See id at 2592-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1982)).
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its, inter alia, employment discrimination based on race. 96 Section 706(g), the
remedy provision of the Act, authorizes a court, after finding that an employer
has intentionally engaged in unlawful employment discrimination, to order ap-
propriate injunctive relief and other "affirmative action," including but not lim-
ited to reinstatement, rehiring, and awards of back pay. 97 In Griggs v. Duke
Power,98 the Supreme Court held that the substantive prohibitions of the Act
could be violated either by intentional discrimination or by facially neutral ac-
tions having an unjustifiable discriminatory impact.99
Section 703(h), which first emerged as part of a compromise bill during the
Title VII enactment process, provides that, notwithstanding the other provisions
of the Act, employers are permitted to apply different standards, terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment to workers as long as they do so pursuant to a
bona fide seniority or merit plan in a way that is not intentionally discrimina-
tory. 100 Relatively strong statements in the legislative history indicate that Con-
gress added section 703(h) in order to minimize interference with seniority
rights, at least those seniority rights that had already vested on the effective date
of the Act.101
In 1972, Congress amended section 706(g) to ensure that courts had enough
96. Id. Section 703(a) of the Act provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Id. at § 2000e-2(a).
97. Id. at § 2000e-5(g). Section 706(g) of the Act states:
(g) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engag-
ing in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affTative
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor
organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. . . . No order of the court shall require
the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstate-
ment or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if
such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or
advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on ac-
count of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this
title.
Id.
98. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
99. Id. at 429-31.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Section 703(h) of the Act states:
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subehapter, it shall not be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system,
• . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ...
Id.
101. See, eg., 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964) (interpretive memorandum by two Title VII sponsors stat-
ing no intent to affect seniority rights); id. at 7207 (Justice Department statement that Title VII would not
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discretion in fashioning remedies for Title VII violations to provide "the most
complete relief possible," so that victims of employment discrimination could be
"so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not
for the unlawful discrimination."' 10 2 Congress authorized this make-whole relief
by adding to the forms of relief already specified in section 706(g) the phrase "or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 10 3 The legislative
history of the 1972 amendment also specifically approved of the case law that
had developed concerning Title VII remedies, much of which had interfered
with preexisting seniority systems by granting retroactive seniority to victims of
discrimination. 1 4
The Supreme Court first considered the interaction between the broad reme-
dial policies of section 706(g) and the seniority-protection policy of section
703(h) in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. 105 In an opinion written by
Justice Brennan, Franks held that: (1) section 706(g) authorized awards of ret-
roactive seniority to those who could prove that they were the victims of dis-
criminatory hiring; 106 (2) although section 703(h) provided some measure of
protection to accrued seniority, it did not preclude the award of retroactive sen-
iority to victims of past discrimination, even though such awards would dilute
the seniority rights of white workers hired pursuant to the employer's discrimi-
natory policies; 107 and, (3) although retroactive seniority should be ordered only
when the equities of a case so dictated, it was the preferred remedy in hiring-
discrimination cases, despite its potentially adverse effect on innocent white em-
ployees. 108 Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, which argued that although there was no absolute bar to
awarding retroactive seniority, it was generally more equitable to provide mone-
tary compensation to victims of hiring discrimination in the form of "front pay"
than it was to award retroactive seniority, which generally penalized innocent
white employees. 109 Justice Powell also concurred in part and dissented in part,
in an opinion signed by Justice Rehnquist. He agreed that section 703(h) did not
insulate even bona fide seniority systems from retroactive seniority awards where
adherence to the seniority systems would perpetuate the effects of past discrimi-
nation, but argued that retroactive seniority should not be viewed as the pre-
ferred remedy in typical cases. Rather, district courts should be encouraged to
undermine existing seniority rights); see also Franks v. Bowman Transp., 424 U.S. 747, 758-60 (1976)
(describing legislative intent to protect existing seniority rights).
102. 118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7168 (1972) (interpretive memorandum by Senators Williams and Javits to
accompany Conference Committee's amendments to Title VII enforcement provisions); see also H.R.
REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2137
(House Conference Committee Report).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971), reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2137 (describing purpose of 1972 amendments); see also
Franks, 424 U.S. at 763 (describing Congressional intent).
104. See, eg., S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 n.1 (1971) (citing with approval federal court
decisions granting retroactive seniority relief); 118 CONG. REc. 7166 (1972) (citing intent that existing
case law continues to govern construction and application of Title VII); see also Franks, 424 U.S. at 762-
67 (describing legislative intent to allow continued use of retroactive seniority remedy).
105. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
106. Id at 762-70.
107. Id. at 757-62.
108. Id. at 770-79.
109. Id at 780-81 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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formulate equitable decrees that better protected the interests of innocent white
employees.' 10 Justice Stevens took no part in the decision, but every Justice who
did participate agreed that Title VII could, in some instances, authorize interfer-
ence with bona fide seniority plans through the award of retroactive seniority.
The Franks holding was refined in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States."' The Teamsters majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart
and signed by seven members of the Court, balanced the competing make-whole
and seniority policies of Title VII by construing section 703(h) to permit retroac-
tive seniority awards designed to remedy the effects of discrimination that oc-
curred after the effective date of Title VII, but not of discrimination that
occurred before that date.'1 2 In addition, the Court emphasized that awards of
retroactive seniority were limited to those individuals who could prove that they
were actual victims of the employer's discriminatory policies and were not avail-
able to individuals merely because of their membership in the racial minority
group that had been discriminated against." 3 The Court did, however, read
Franks to permit the threshold showing of discriminatory intent required for
access to section 706(g) remedies, including retroactive seniority, to be presump-
tively satisfied through demonstration of a class-wide pattern and practice of
discrimination, rather than insisting on an individualized showing of intentional
discrimination against each class member." 4 Significantly, the major element in
proof of a class-wide pattern and practice of intentional discrimination is typi-
cally statistical evidence establishing an unexplained discriminatory impact on
the minority group seeking relief." 5 Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed with
the majority as far as it went, but would also have permitted retroactive seniority
awards to remedy the effects of some pre-Act discrimination." 6
The final pre-Stotts gloss to the contest between affirmative action and senior-
ity was added by American Tobacco Company v. Patterson,"7 a 5-4 decision in
which the majority opinion was written by Justice White, the author of the Stotts
majority opinion. In American Tobacco, the Court held that section 703(h) im-
munized bona fide seniority systems from legal challenge even if they were
adopted after the effective date of Title VII, and even if they perpetuated the
effects of post-Act discrimination. The Court found congressional desire to pro-
110. Id. at 781-82 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
112. Id. at 348-55. The Court also held that, without more, the fact that a seniority plan perpetuated
the effects of pre-Act discrimination could not preclude the plan from being "bona fide" or render it "the
result of an intention to discriminate," which would make § 703(h) protections inapplicable. Id.
113. Id. at 356-71.
114. Id. at 357-62. If the employer rebuts this presumption, the plaintiff must offer further proof of
individual discrimination in order to secure a § 706(g) remedy. Id.
115. See id. at 334-40 and cases cited therein; cf Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977) (discussing use of statistical and other circumstantial evidence to prove inten-
tional discrimination necessary for establishment of fourteenth amendment equal protection violation);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-42 (1976) (same). Prior to Stotts, the federal circuits all agreed
that class-wide, race-conscious relief could be appropriate in the absence of individualized proof of pur-
poseful discrimination. See Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2606 & n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Compare the
discussion of the Court's treatment of impact and intent in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S.
63 (1982), infra note 125 and accompanying text.
116. Teamsters at 377-80 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. 456 U.S. 63 (1982). When the Court decided American Tobacco, Justice O'Connor had replaced
Justice Stewart on the Supreme Court.
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tect seniority to be such that section 703(h) applied regardless of when the plan
was adopted and regardless of its discriminatory impact.118 In order to be be-
yond the scope of section 703(h) protection, a seniority plan had to be the prod-
uct of a discriminatory purpose." 9 In so holding, the Court expressly rejected
the Teamsters interpretation that section 703(h) protected only seniority rights
that existed on the effective date of Title VII. The Court instead held that all
bona fide seniority rights were encompassed by the provision, regardless of when
they accrued.120 In the American Tobacco context at least, this shifted the oper-
ative balance between the remedial and seniority policies of Title VII. Under
Teamsters, the balance had been struck between pre- and post-Act accrual of
seniority.121 American Tobacco reformulated that balance by rejuvenating the
distinction between intentional discrimination and mere disparate impact which
the Court had rejected in Griggs.122 Only proof of intentional discrimination
permitted seniority to be overridden.
Justice Brennan dissented in an opinion signed by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, arguing that section 703(h) could not properly be applied to the
adoption of seniority plans after the effective date of the Act. He reasoned that
the purpose of section 703(h) was to protect legitimate employee expectations
based upon seniority, but no such expectations could arise with respect to senior-
ity plans that violated other provisions of Title VII if those plans were adopted
after the effective date of the Act. As long as those plans were challenged for
perpetuating the effects of post-Act discrimination within 180 days after their
adoption, as is required under the Act, there would be no time for legitimate
seniority expectations to arise.' 23
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent, which fortified Justice Brennan's po-
sition, arguing that section 703(h) by its terms was inapplicable because a senior-
ity system knowingly adopted despite its perpetuation of post-Act discrimination
could not be bona fide within the meaning of section 703(h). The adoption of
such a seniority system, in the absence of adequate business justification, itself
would constitute an act of racial discrimination that violated Title VII. Justice
Stevens, therefore, concluded that section 703(h) could apply to seniority plans
adopted after the effective date of the Act, but only to bona fide plans that did
not have an unlawfully discriminatory impact. 124
It is not clear that there is any difference between the positions of Justice Ste-
vens and the other dissenters. None would insulate a seniority plan from Title
VII scrutiny simply because it was a seniority plan. All would invalidate the
adoption of any seniority plan whose disparate impact, discounted by any busi-
ness purpose that the plan served, was sufficient without reference to section
118. Id. at 68-75.
119. Id. at 69-70.
120. Id. at 71-75. Justice White did not reach the question of whether the plan at issue was a bona fide
seniority plan, concluding that further factual development was required for proper resolution of that
question.
121. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing Teamsters construction of § 703(h) as per-
mitting remedial retroactive seniority awards as long as discriminatory practice occurred after effective
date of Title VII).
122. See supra text accompanying note 99 (discussing Griggs holding).
123. 456 U.S. at 80-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 86-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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703(h) to amount to a Title VII violation. Thus, for the dissenters, section
703(h) added nothing to the law governing the adoption of seniority plans.
The position of the majority, however, appears to be that seniority plans, by
virtue of section 703(h), are judged under a more lenient substantive standard
than other employer actions for the purpose of determining whether a Title VII
violation exists. The showing of disparate impact that is otherwise sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under Title VII seems
insufficient to establish that the adoption of a seniority plan perpetuating the
effects of post-Act discrimination violates Title VII; a stronger showing of dis-
criminatory purpose appears to be required. 125
In sum, Title VII, as construed in Griggs, prohibits discrminatory employment
practices whether they result from intentional discrimination or merely have a
discriminatory impact. Nominally, section 706(g) authorizes the issuance of ap-
propriate equitable relief only after a showing of intentional discrimination. As a
practical matter, however, Griggs, Franks, and Teamsters permit the requisite
showing of intentional discrimination to be made through unrebutted statistical
evidence of discriminatory impact. Moreover, section 703(h) does not itself bar
injunctive relief under section 706(g), even if such relief interferes with post-Act
seniority accumulated by innocent whites; the interests of innocent whites are to
be considered in determining whether a particular form of relief is or is not equi-
table under the particular circumstances presented. Nevertheless, where senior-
ity is involved, two additional factors may limit the availability of a section
706(g) remedy. First, Teamsters requires individuals seeking awards of retroac-
tive seniority to prove that they are themselves victims of intentional discrimina-
tion, rather than merely members of the minority group alleged to have been
discriminated against. Second, in order to overcome section 703(h) seniority
protections, American Tobacco may require a showing of intentional discrimina-
tion that is more particularized than the statistical showing otherwise adequate
to obtain a section 706(g) remedy under Griggs, Franks and Teamsters.
125. Compare text accompanying notes 118 to 122 (discussing American Tobacco majority view that
discriminatory impact, without intent, insufficient to invalidate seniority plan) with text accompanying
notes 123 to 124 (discussing American Tobacco dissenters' view that unexplained discriminatory impact
invalidates seniority plan). Generally, a showing of discriminatory impact is sufficient to establish a prima
facie Title VII violation, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971), and even to secure a
§ 706(g) remedy, such as retroactive seniority, which is available only after a showing of intentional dis-
crimination. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 334-40, 357-62. Section 703(h), however, protects the operation
of bona fide seniority plans from challenges based on the disparate impact that they cause, unless the
disparate impact results from "an intention to discriminate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h); see supra note 100
(quoting § 703(h)). Section 706(g) also contains an intent requirement, as a prerequisite to obtaining a
remedy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); see supra note 97 (quoting § 70 6 (g)). Presumably, it is the intent require-
ment in § 703(h)-ag opposed to the weaker language in § 706(g)--that caused the majority to focus on
discriminatory purpose, rather than effect, in electing to tolerate the disparate impact of the American
Tobacco seniority plan. See 456 U.S. at 70 ("Such an injunction [against future application of a discrimi-
natory seniority system], however, would lie only if the requirement of § 7030)-that such application be
intentionally discriminatory-were satisfied."). As the dissenters point out, however, nothing in the lan-
guage or apparent purpose of § 703(h) requires the adoption of a seniority system to be judged under a
discriminatory-purpose standard. Although § 703(h) protects the operation of seniority plans, it says
nothing about the showing that must be made to bring them into existence consistent with Title VII.
Rather, the adoption of a seniority plan would appear to be just another employment practice covered by
Title VII and governed by the discriminatory-effect standard of § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2),
consistent with Griggs. Compare the discussion of the Court's treatment of impact and intent in Team-
sters, supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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Against the backdrop of this case law, the question of whether the Stotts con-
sent decree was properly modified is easy to resolve-either way. Assuming that
the trial court exercised sound equitable discretion in light of the changed eco-
nomic circumstances in Memphis, the decree was properly modified unless one
of the restrictions on Title VII relief applied and prevented modification.126 The
Stotts majority holds that, because the consent decree affected seniority rights,
the plaintiffs were precluded from obtaining relief in light of their failure to
prove that they were themselves victims of discrimination. 127 Moreover, even
though seniority-based layoffs would have a racially disparate impact, the City's
seniority plan was nevertheless entitled to section 703(h) protection because the
plaintiffs failed to prove that adherence to the plan was an act of intentional
discrimination. 128 There are problems, however, with the majority's reasoning
in Stotts.
The Teamsters requirement that individual plaintiffs prove that they are vic-
tims of discrimination was articulated in the context of a suit seeking awards of
retroactive seniority, and the requirement appears to be limited to that context.
As the Stotts dissent points out, the individualized, as opposed to class-wide,
proof that Teamsters requires makes sense only in the context of a request for
individualized, as opposed to class-wide relief.129 Indeed, if this were not the
case, the prospective injunctive relief awarded in Griggs, Franks, and Teamsters
itself would have been improper. In Stotts, however, no one sought retroactive
seniority or any other type of individualized relief. Rather, the plaintiffs sought
prospective class-wide relief in the form of an injunction prohibiting future use of
the Memphis seniority plan in making layoff determinations. Because individu-
alized relief was not at issue in Stotts, the Teamsters proof requirement was not
applicable.130
It may be that the Court considered even prospective injunctive relief to be
unavailable because the plaintiffs had chosen to settle their case rather than
prove the existence of a pattern and practice of discrimination after a trial on the
merits.' 31 However, the technical absence of a finding that the defendants had
engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination hardly seems significant.
The consent decree was not entered into until extensive discovery had been com-
126. Even if Title VII did not preclude modification, the trial court would still have been precluded
from modifying the consent decree if the equities did not warrant modification, and its attendant interfer-
ence with seniority rights, in the particular circumstances before the court. See 104 S. Ct. at 2588 (even
after showing of discriminatory impact, courts must balance equities before ordering layoff to restore
discriminatee's job); see also id. at 2593 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (courts can award preferential treat-
ment only after balancing competing interests of discriminatees, innocent workers, and employer). As is
apparent, however, a standard as broad as "doing what the equities require" provides no more guidance
or constraint than a standard requiring the court to prohibit unjust discrimination.
127. See id. at 2588.
128. See id. at 2587.
129. See id. at 2605-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (race-conscious relief without proof of individual
discrimination appropriate in class action suits to remedy class-wide discrimination).
130. The consent decree did provide for certain back-pay awards, see supra note 23, but those awards
are not relevant to the modification issue.
131. It is difficult to know precisely what the Court's position is with respect to this issue. At times the
majority appears to be troubled by deficiencies in the plaintiffs' proof resulting from the plaintiffs' election
of settlement over trial, see 104 S. Ct. at 2587, 2590 n.16, something that was particularly important to
Justice O'Connor. See id at 2593-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). At other times, however, the Court
appears to assert that modification of the consent decree would be precluded even if the case had gone to
trial and the plaintiffs had proven a pattern and practice of discrimination. See id. at 2588.
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pleted, and the record was replete with statistical evidence creating a strong in-
ference of intentional discrimination. 132 Moreover, while the City did not admit
to having engaged in unlawful discrimination, the Justice Department decree
that was incorporated into the Stotts decree both admitted that an inference of
discrimination could be drawn from the City's past hiring practices and charac-
terized the decree as designed to remedy what it referred to as "past discrimina-
tion." 133 In addition, as the dissent points out, because the trial court merely
issued a preliminary injunction, there was never any occasion for a trial to estab-
lish whether the City had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination. 134
This is particularly important because the plaintiffs alleged not only that the City
had engaged in hiring discrimination generally, but that even the layoffs them-
selves were the product of intentional discrimination. 135 Because the City's ap-
peal of the trial court's preliminary injunction postponed the need to prove those
allegations, it would seem that the most the Supreme Court properly could have
done was remand for continuation of the district court proceedings, including a
trial at which the plaintiffs would have to prove a pattern and practice of dis-
crimination if they wanted their preliminary injunction to be made perma-
nent.1 36 Given the opportunity, the plaintiffs could certainly have made such a
showing. This is real life, after all, and no one seriously doubts that the City of
Memphis engaged in a pattern and practice of hiring discrimination. 137
Assuming that the absence of technical findings is not fatal, the trial court's
Title VII authority to issue a preliminary injunction modifying the consent de-
cree would appear to follow directly from the Supreme Court's approval of pro-
spective injunctive relief in Griggs and in the class-wide portions of both Franks
and Teamsters. It is possible, however, that there is something special about the
seniority rights implicated in Stotts that distinguishes Stotts from the pattern-
and-practice aspects of those other cases. Interference with seniority is what dis-
tinguished the class-wide from the individualized aspects of Franks and Team-
sters, and the Court's heavy reliance on section 703(h) in Stottst 38 suggests that
seniority considerations may have been dispositive in that case as well.
132. See 679 F.2d at 551; see also supra notes 15 to 17 and accompanying text (discussing unexplained
racial disparities in City's hiring and promotion practices).
133. 679 F.2d at 570-71 app.; see supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Department
suit against City).
134. 104 S. Ct. at 2606-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 2603-04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 2603 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority improperly treated injunction as
permanent, foreclosing plaintiffs' opportunity to substantiate allegations of discrimination).
137. Justice White's refusal to remand the case for a permanent injunction hearing is ironic in light of
his insistence on a remand for further factual development in American Tobacco before ruling on the bona
fides of the seniority plan there at issue, even though permanent injunctive relief had already been granted.
See 456 U.S. at 66-67, 77 n.18; see also supra note 120 (discussingAmerican Tobacco remand to determine
if seniority system bona fide).
The consequence of insisting on an actual judicial "finding" of discrimination prior to modification of a
consent decree is likely to be a reduction in the number of Title VII cases that are voluntarily settled.
Defendants will, of course, be reluctant to admit explicitly that they have engaged in a pattern and prac-
tice of racial discrimination, and after Stotts plaintiffs will be reluctant to enter into consent decrees unless
defendants first make the necessary admissions. Such a requirement would undermine one of the recog-
nized objectives of Title VII, which is to encourage voluntary settlement of discrimination cases. See 104
S. Ct. at 2605 n.20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing congressional policy to encourage voluntary
settlement of Title VII suits).
138. See 104 S. Ct. at 2587.
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Although the majority did not specifically so hold, American Tobacco may
well stand for the proposition that even in class-wide pattern-and-practice cases,
if the issuance of prospective injunctive relief would interfere with seniority
rights, such relief is precluded unless the plaintiff first proves intentional discrim-
ination and does so with a high degree of particularity.1 39 Because American
Tobacco can be read to impose a higher substantive standard for Title VII viola-
tions involving seniority than for other Title VII violations, the Griggs-type proof
of disparate impact that is sufficient to establish "intentional discrimination" for
the purposes of section 706(g) may not be sufficient to establish the type of "in-
tentional discrimination" required to overcome seniority protections under sec-
tion 703(h). It may be that whenever seniority is involved, Title VII is simply
not violated unless the defendant is shown to have engaged in the type of pur-
poseful discrimination that the Court had in mind when it decided American
Tobacco.14o
The problem with this explanation of the Stotts decision is that, while section
703(h) and American Tobacco may provide special protections for seniority,
modification of the Stotts decree had nothing to do with seniority. First, the
district court never directly ordered the City to depart from its seniority system.
The court merely ordered the City to maintain current percentages of blacks in
the Memphis Fire Department. The City, not the court, chose to deal with its
fiscal problems by making layoffs in the Fire Department, rather than making
them in other employment divisions that were not subject to a consent decree, or
rather than avoiding them altogether by borrowing money or raising additional
revenues in some other way. The City, not the court, chose to bring its seniority
policy into conflict with its affirmative action obligations.14' Second, and even
more important, the preliminary injunction issued in Stotts did not interfere with
anyone's seniority rights. All of the affected employees were hired on the same
day and thus had equal seniority. 142 Under the facts of Stotts, the seniority that
section 703(h) is designed to protect was simply never implicated. In light of all
this, it is difficult to conclude that section 703(h) bars modification of the consent
decree. The Stotts record seems to establish a pattern and practice of intentional
discrimination that was adequate for the type of prospective, class-wide injunc-
tive relief that the plaintiffs had requested. 143
139. The Court in American Tobacco never elaborated on the type of purposeful discrimination that is
necessary to overcome the seniority protections of § 703(h), but it is clear that mere unjustified disparate
impact is not sufficient. See 456 U.S. at 69-71; see also supra note 118 (discussing American Tobacco's
interpretation of § 703(h)).
140. See Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2592 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that Title VII protects bona fide
seniority systems with discriminatory effects as long as no intentional discrimination); id. at 2587
(§ 703(h) allows use of bona fide seniority system employment practices that have disparate impact as
long as no intentional discrimination).
141. See 104 S. Ct. at 2602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that preliminary injunction limited City's
ability to lay off blacks, but did not affect other fiscal options).
142. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing provision in City's seniority plan that layoffs
between employees with equal seniority were to be made in reverse alphabetical order).
143. Even if the facts in Stotts were read to implicate seniority rights, it may well be that the plaintiffs
proved the type of intentional discrimination that is required to overcome § 703(h) seniority protections
under American Tobacco. The trial court found that Memphis did not adopt its seniority plan with an
intent to discriminate, but the court did find that application of the plan for the purpose of making layoff
determinations was not bona fide. See 104 S. Ct. at 2587. The court of appeals overruled this finding but
held the injunction proper in the apparent belief that evidence sufficient to satisfy the lenient "intentional
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There is a substantial counterargument, however. The suggestion that Team-
sters is inapplicable and that the Stotts plaintiffs were not required to prove that
they were victims of discrimination because they were seeking class-wide rather
than individualized relief ignores the reality of what the Stotts plaintiffs were
trying to accomplish. The plaintiffs wished to have more-senior whites laid off
instead of less-senior blacks. 144 Any such relief would necessarily constitute the
functional equivalent of a retroactive seniority award to any black firefighter who
was not laid off but who would have been, absent judicial modification of the
consent decree. For such black firefighters, individualized relief is precisely what
was at stake. The beneficiaries of the requested injunction were particular indi-
viduals with particular names and particular employment histories. Because the
preliminary injunction effectively granted retroactive seniority to those firefight-
ers without first requiring them to make the individualized evidentiary showing
demanded by Teamsters, issuance of the preliminary injunction was not author-
ized under Title VII.
Even if one were to reject this retroactive seniority argument and view the case
as a pattern-and-practice case, the injunction would still be unauthorized be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of a pattern and practice of dis-
crimination. The fact that the record might have supported a finding of
discrimination means nothing if that finding was not actually made. As the ma-
jority points out, the plaintiffs in Stotts chose not to pursue an ultimate adjudica-
tion on the merits. 145 As a result, they never obtained the finding of class-wide
discrimination required for the issuance of class-wide injunctive relief. This is no
mere technical defect. When parties choose to settle a suit rather than obtain an
adjudication of the merits, they avoid the expense and uncertainty of litigation,
but in exchange, they forgo rights they might have secured by prevailing after
trial. That is precisely what happened here.
By settling their case, the Stotts plaintiffs secured the City's voluntary commit-
ment to hiring and promotion quotas, something to which they may or may not
have been entitled after trial. In exchange, however, they gave up the right to
any further relief that might have been available after a favorable adjudication of
the merits. If the plaintiffs were now permitted to obtain a court order modify-
ing the consent decree, they would be breaching their agreement with the City,
simply because their bargain did not turn out to be as favorable as they might
have wished. Moreover, they would be doing so to the detriment of the innocent
white firefighters on whose behalf the City agreed to the settlement. 146
discrimination" standard of § 706(g) was also sufficient to overcome § 703(h) protections. See 679 F.2d
551 n.6 (discussing lack of discriminatory intent). It may be that the lower courts would have made the
findings required by American Tobacco if they had better understood what significance the Supreme Court
would attach to the presence or absence of those findings, especially in light of the plaintiffs' allegations
that the layoffs had been conducted in an intentionally discriminatory manner. See id. at 2603 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (discussing plaintiffs' allegations).
144. The whites that the plaintiffs wished to have laid off were "more senior" as defined by the City's
plan, which included laying off employees hired on the same day in reverse alphabetical order. See supra
note 30 (discussing City's seniority plan).
145. Id. at 2588; see also id. at 2593 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (plaintiffs waived right to further relief
by entering into consent decree).
146. See id at 2588. The importance of an actual finding is also suggested by the Court's denial of
certiorari, a mere 13 days after Stotts was decided, in another case involving municipal layoffs. In that
case, the lower court had circumvented seniority protections in order to maintain current levels of minor-
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This argument against granting the injunction is bolstered by the special pro-
tection that section 703(h) gives to seniority plans. Even if one assumes that
unmade findings of fact properly can be inferred from the statistical evidence
contained in the Stotts record notwithstanding the parties' settlement agreement,
the special protections accorded seniority by section 703(h) still preclude modifi-
cation of the consent decree. American Tobacco indicates that, as a matter of
substantive Title VII law, judicial interference with seniority must be based upon
more than mere statistical evidence of disparate impact. Section 703(h) permits
interference with seniority only after a showing of discriminatory intent that is
rooted in hard evidence rather than statistical inference. However much the
Stotts record may have supported a statistically based finding of a pattern and
practice of discrimination, that record did not contain the kind of direct evidence
of intentional discrimination required by American Tobacco where seniority is
involved. Moreover, the fact .that the layoffs in Stotts, under both the original
and modified plans, were to be made on an alphabetical basis does not under-
mine this seniority based argument. The Memphis plan provided for breaking
ties in seniority through layoffs in reverse alphabetical order. 147 Accordingly,
interference with the alphabetical provision, which was an integral part of the
seniority plan itself, constituted interference with the principle of seniority and
thereby triggered section 703(h) protections. Viewed in this light, the absence of
adequate proof of discrimination in Stotts can be seen to have deprived the trial
court of any Title VII authority it might otherwise have had to modify the con-
sent decree.
Which view of the case is correct? Logically, the view of the case that better
corresponds to the actual nature of the problem presented in Stotts should pre-
vail. The fundamental difference between the majority and the dissenting posi-
tions relates to the individual as opposed to the group nature of rights conferred
by Title VII. The majority viewed Title VII as protecting individual rights. Ac-
cordingly, the majority denied the black plaintiffs retrospective relief because
they were seeking what amounted to reparations for past injuries inflicted on an
entire group, but were doing so under a statute that, as the retroactive-seniority
portion of Teamsters indicates, was designed to provide retrospective relief only
to demonstrated individual victims of discrimination. The dissenters, however
viewed Title VII as protecting group rights. Accordingly, they would have
granted the black plaintiffs prospective injunctive relief because they believed
that section 706(g), in authorizing broad and flexible remedies for Title VII vio-
lations, was designed to improve the social and economic condition of blacks as a
group.
The broad readings of Stotts as a pathbreaking race discrimination case 148 or
as a case that prohibits quotas and even affirmative action itself' 49 focus on the
ity employment-the precise action that appears to have been prohibited in Stotts-but only after making
a formal finding that the defendant had engaged in a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination-a
finding never made in Stotts. See Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F. Supp. 904, 944-48 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding
of intentional discrimination) and 520 F. Supp. 961 (1981) (issuance of injunction), affid, 712 F.2d 816,
822-24 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3555 (1984).
147. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing City's seniority plan).
148. See, e.g., Will, supra note 7 (declaring Stotts to be "the most important civil rights ruling of the
decade").
149. See, eg., Kraft, supra note 7 (Stotts "left a cloud over the constitutionality of any affirmative
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majority's apparent rejection of the group nature of discrimination and discrimi-
nation remedies. Moreover, the precise meaning of the legislative history on
which the Stotts majority relies depends upon prior specification of discrimina-
tion as an individual or group problem.150
The suggestion that proper resolution of our discrimination problems turns on
proper appreciation of the group or individual nature of those problems has
gained considerable currency.15 1 Moreover, the underlying premise of much of
the critical literature that now occupies the cutting edge of legal scholarship
would suggest that proper characterization of discrimination problems is cru-
cial.152 Indeed, the more philosophical strands of this literature seek to account
for the present inadequacy of many of our legal doctrines by demonstrating the
action program"); Justice Department Declares Win over Quotas, supra note 8 (Justice Department states
court-ordered or court-enforced quotas illegal under federal civil rights law); High Court Rules for Senior-
ity, Not Affirmative Action, supra note 7 (suggesting that Stotts' language expands holding beyond seniority
context). The question of whether the Stotts holding-whatever it may eventually come to mean-is
limited to the context of seniority or applies to all affirmative action probably turns on whether the Court
was construing the intentional discrimination requirement of § 703(h), which governs interference with
seniority, or whether it was construing the intentional discrimination requirements of § 706(g), which
governs all Title VII remedies. One can speculate, cf supra note 125 (arguing that Court focused on
§ 703(h)), but Reagan Administration rhetoric notwithstanding, one cannot make this determination on
the basis of the Stotts opinion alone. It is unlikely that the Justices themselves have yet decided which
provision Stotts will ultimately be deemed to have construed.
150. The majority relies heavily on a statement made by Senator Humphrey during the legislative
debates on Title VII, which can be read to support either the majority or the dissent, depending upon the
view that one takes of the group or individual nature of discrimination:
No court order can require hiring, reinstatement, admission to membership, or payment of
back pay for anyone who was not fired, refused employment or advancement or admission to a
union by an act of discrimination forbidden by this title. This is stated expressly in the last
sentence of Section 707(e) [enacted without relevant change as § 706(g)].. . .Contrary to the
allegations of some opponents of this title, there is nothing in it that will give any power to the
Commission or to any court to require [hiring,] firing[, or promotion] of employees in order to
meet a racial 'quota' or to achieve a certain racial balance. That bugaboo has been brought up a
dozen times; but is nonexistent.
104 S. Ct. at 2589 (citing 110 CONG. Rnc. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). If, like the major-
ity, one believes discrimination to be essentially an individual problem, the quoted language can be read to
prohibit affirmative action injunctions in which individuals are hired, insulated from layoffs or promoted
because of their membership in a particular racial minority group. If, however, one believes discrimina-
tion to be a group problem for which group-wide affirmative action constitutes an appropriate remedy, the
quoted language can be interpreted to prohibit only preferential treatment for identifiable workers, whose
names are known, unless they are able to show that they were discriminated against personally. Under
this reading, the quoted statement simply does not concern the circumstances under which group-wide
affirmative action might or might not be available. To the extent that this latter reading might be viewed
as a strained reading of Senator Humphrey's statement, such a reading does comport with the pre-Stotts
practice of every circuit in approving race-conscious affirmative action, see 104 S. Ct. at 2606 n.10, (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (citing cases from each circuit approving of such action), and it could even prove to be
a reading necessary to ensure that Title VII remedies are constitutionally sufficient in light of the school
desegregation cases. See infra note 156 (noting that school desegregation cases establish that remedies for
lingering effects sometimes must take form of benign racial classifications).
151. Compare Brest, Foreword: In Defense oftheAntidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 48-
52 (1976) (arguing that discrimination, and consequently discrimination remedies, should be viewed as
individual phenomena) and Perry, The Principle of Equal Protection, 32 HASTnGs L.J. 1133, 1145-48
(1981) (same) with Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. Au. 107, 147-77
(1976) (arguing that discrimination, and consequently discriminatory remedies, should be viewed as group
phenomena).
152. See, e-g., Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLITICS oF LAW 96 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982) (arguing that improper focus on individual rather than group nature of discrimination
not only produces bad results but also legitimates counterproductive ways of thinking about race
discrimination).
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ways in which those doctrines emanate from an il-conceived, liberal philosophi-
cal tradition that is designed to protect individual interests from evisceration by
the state, rather than from a better-conceived, communitarian tradition in which
shared group understandings make such legal constraints unnecessary. 153
Assuming that proper characterization of the nature of discrimination
problems is a prerequisite to satisfactory resolution of those problems, it is diffi-
cult to see how a judge could characterize discrimination without recourse to his
or her own subjective reactions to the nature of the problem. The question of
whether discrimination is really an individual or a group phenomenon appears to
be nothing more than a question of perspective. Indeed, even the choice of the
appropriate dichotomy seems to be nothing more than a matter of personal per-
spective. Several other dichotomies could serve as the basis for classification-
such as the innocence/fault dichotomy, the earned/unearned dichotomy, or the
public/private dichotomy-and it is hard to conclude that one dichotomy is ob-
jectively more appropriate than another. 154 Even if the genuinely appropriate
dichotomy could be selected in a satisfactory objective manner, however, the
judge would still have to determine which half of the dichotomy genuinely em-
braced his or her legal problem.
Judges seeking proper characterization of the nature of discrimination would
seem to have only three available options. First, they could characterize the
problem on the basis of whatever functional concerns they perceived to be at
stake, but this would make their characterizations subject to the subjectivity of
all functional analysis. Second, they could balance the individual against the
group aspects of discrimination in order to determine the true nature of discrimi-
nation, but the outcome would merely embody the subjectivity inherent in any
balancing process. Finally, the judges could simply proclaim the true nature of
discrimination to be whatever it struck them as being, without regard to the
reason that it happened to strike them that way. That would, however, consti-
tute a blatant submission to subjectivity. Such a proclamation, if not based on
some sort of rational analysis, would necessarily be the product of the judges'
psychological makeup or socialization or some similar determining factor,
which, of course, is precisely what it means to say that something is subjec-
tive. 155 Because the "true" nature of a problem is simply a statement about
perspective, and because subjective elements seem to be essential in the establish-
ment of perspective, the "true" nature of legal problems can only be ascertained
through recourse to subjective values. 156
153. See, eg., Tushnet, supra note 2, at 782-86, 824-27 (arguing that constitutional dogmas of interpre-
tivism and neutral principles developed as solution to Hobbesian problem of restraining sovereign's power
by establishing standard for evaluating judicial performance).
154. See Edley, Justice" In the Eye of the Beholder, 35 HARv. L. ScH. BULL. 6, 7-8 (Spring 1984)
(discussing how different dichotomies affect view about affirmative action and how dichotomies involve
moral judgments).
155. It is only for the sake of argument that I am willing to concede that rational analysis could ever be
detached from factors that determine subjective preferences.
156. Although the plaintiffs in Stotts alleged constitutional as well as statutory violations, see 104 S. Ct.
at 2581, the Supreme Court barely discusses those constitutional claims, addressing them only in a single
footnote. See id. at 2590 n.16. The majority holds that Title VII precluded interference with seniority
rights under the facts presented in Stotts, but that holding would have been inconsequential if the Consti-
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II. THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE
I have suggested that each of the legal issues presented in Stotts could just as
tution itself provided relief that entailed interference with seniority. In that event, Title VII would simply
have been unconstitutional as applied to the facts of Stotts.
The school desegregation cases have now established that equal protection violations cannot be reme-
died simply through adherence to prospective racial neutrality. Rather, the fourteenth amendment also
requires some remedy for the lingering effects of past discrimination. See Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971) and cases cited therein (court has broad equitable power to
remedy past wrongs of segregation). Moreover, the remedy can, and sometimes must, take the form of
benign racial classifications, and those remedial classifications do not themselves offend the equal protec-
tion provision. See id. at 18-20 (plan for faculty assignment based on race constitutional as part of overall
effort to desegregate); see also North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swan, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971) (flat
prohibition of race-based student assignments unconstitutional; duty to desegregate requires consideration
of race in formulating remedy); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971) (school board properly took
students' race into account in drawing attendance lines to achieve greater racial balance). Why then does
the fourteenth amendment not preclude the City from insisting on seniority-based layoffs that would
undermine the remedial objectives of the Stotts decree? Indeed, a federal district court has held that
seniority-based layoffs of police officers, which undermined the hiring gains made by minority police of-
ficers under an affirmative action decree, violated the equal protection clause, notwithstanding any Title
VII protections that the seniority plan might have had. See NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 53
U.S.L.W. 2065 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
The equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment is violated only by intentional discrimina-
tion. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-41 (1976) (holding that intentional discrimination must
be shown for finding of equal protection violation). Accordingly, it is possible to argue that the fourteenth
amendment permits adherence to the Memphis seniority plan because there was no finding of past inten-
tional discrimination. Indeed, the Court seems to have accepted this argument in its footnote reference to
the constitutional claims. See 104 S. Ct. at 2590 n.16. This argument, however, is only as persuasive here
as it was in the Title VII context. Cf supra notes 132 to 145 and accompanying text (arguing that only
reason for no finding of past discrimination was parties' decision to settle).
What makes more sense is that the Court tacitly assumed Title VII remedies to be coterminous with, or
more liberal than, whatever remedies the Constitution requires. If so, the Court's holding that no Title
VII violation had occurred would have precluded the need to consider potential constitutional violations,
which could not exist in the absence of a Title VII violation. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
132-40, 145 (1976), suggests that the meaning of "discrimination" in Title VII is similar to its meaning for
equal protection purposes. Moreover, there is language in Washington v. Davis suggesting that courts
scrutinize allegedly discriminatory actions less closely for fourteenth amendment purposes than they do
for Title VII purposes, although there is no discussion of why this should be the case. See 426 U.S. at 247.
There is, however, a serious problem with assuming that the scope of the constitutional prohibition
merely mirrors the scope of Title VII. Such a view would eliminate the possibility of ever holding a
congressionally prescribed remedy unconstitutional because it provided insufficient relief. If, for example,
§ 703(h) simply precluded all awards of retroactive seniority, the school desegregation cases suggest that
the provision would be unconstitutional for the same reason that state prohibitions on benign racial classi-
fications have been held unconstitutional-it would improperly interfere with compensatory relief for the
victims of discrimination. True, Congress has been given a special role in the enforcement of the four-
teenth amendment, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-50 (1966), but that special role is gener-
ally thought to be limited to prohibiting actions that might not otherwise constitute fourteenth
amendment violations. Congress is not typically viewed as able to authorize an action that would other-
wise violate the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, such deference to a politically accountable legislature,
reflecting the transitory biases and prejudices of the electorate, would seem seriously to frustrate the
protection of politically underrepresented minorities. This, in turn, would seem to undermine the whole
point of judicial review, at least under one theory. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISRusr: A
THEORY OF JUDiciAL REVIEW (1980). There is no apparent reason, therefore, why the plaintiffs might
not have been entitled to constitutional relief from the operation of the Memphis seniority plan even if
they were precluded from obtaining statutory relief. And even if there is a reason, certainly it is not so
obvious that it fails to merit discussion.
Because the Court is aware of the plaintiffs' constitutional claim, see 104 S. Ct. at 2581, the Court
necessarily rejects that claim, even though it does not meaningfully discuss it. If this were not the case,
the suit would have been resolved in the plaintiffs' favor. It goes without saying that tacit resolution of
legal issues provides no insulation whatsoever from judicial bias. When a court does not even specify a
legal standard that could potentially generate a result, recourse to subjective values appears to be the only
way that the pertinent issue could have been resolved.
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easily have been resolved one way as the other, because the governing doctrinal
rules are too imprecise to generate only one result. Indeed, I have suggested that
the doctrinal rules are such that they cannot be applied at all except through
recourse to the subjective values of the decision makers. If the doctrinal indeter-
minacy that characterized analysis of the legal issues in Stotts can be generalized
to all legal issues, it raises the question of why we bother with doctrine at all.
Wouldn't it be more honest and efficient to concede the inevitable presence of
bias and simply have our judges decide cases in the way that they deemed best
under the circumstances?
A. GENERALIZATION
There is every reason to believe that the inability of doctrine to control resolu-
tion of the legal issues in Stotts can be generalized to all legal issues. The reason
that the doctrinal formulations were indeterminate in Stotts is that it was always
possible to identify an ambiguity in the applicable legal rule. Sometimes the
ambiguity was created by doctrinal language that was too imprecise to be of
much guidance. For example, doctrinal language describes a justiciable case or
controversy as an action in which the plaintiff is threatened by a "direct injury"
that is "real and immediate" enough to give the plaintiff a "personal stake" in
the outcome of the case, sufficient to ensure the "concrete adverseness" neces-
sary to prevent a case from being dismissed on mootness or ripeness grounds. 157
On other occasions, the ambiguity was more latent, resulting from judicial in-
quiry into an inherently indeterminate theoretical construct, such as the Court's
nominal inquiry into the parties' intent in entering into the Stotts consent decree.
On still other occasions, the ambiguity resulted from uncertainty about proper
legal categorization, such as whether the trial court's preliminary injunction con-
stituted the issuance of an individualized or a class-based remedy. It is virtually
certain that one or another of these types of ambiguities can be found lurking
beneath the surface of any legal issue in any case.
Meaningful resolution of the ambiguities inherent in doctrinal formulations
can be accomplished only through recourse to some more fundamental principle
that the doctrinal rules are designed to implement-such as a principle prohibit-
ing unjust discrimination. Once direct reliance is sought on the imprecise under-
lying principle, however, the subjective preferences of the judge necessarily enter
the analysis, just as they would if the judge were told merely to prevent unjust
discrimination. In fact, they necessarily control the analysis. Resolution of the
doctrinal ambiguity depends upon the meaning of the underlying principle, but
the meaning of the underlying principle itself depends upon the judge's subjec-
tive interpretation of that principle.
In analyzing the Court's analysis of the legal issues in Stotts, I have tried to
illustrate the ways in which three of the most common judicial techniques for
resolving doctrinal ambiguity can work only through invocation of the judge's
personal values. The first such technique is functional or policy analysis. In
discussing the Court's resolution of the mootness issue, I suggested that mean-
ingful resolution of that issue could be achieved only through a functional analy-
157. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) and cases quoted therein (reciting
threshold requirements plaintiffs must satisfy to invoke federal court jurisdiction).
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sis that emphasized fidelity to the policy objectives of the legal rules. Because
policy objectives must be phrased in broad, general, and imprecise terms to be
generally acceptable, however, functional analysis appears to accomplish nothing
more than direct resort to the broad policy objectives themselves would accom-
plish in the way of insulating decisions from judicial bias.
A second common technique for resolving doctrinal ambiguities is interest
balancing. Indeed, some legal doctrines, such as those requiring courts to bal-
ance the equities, explicitly make interest balancing the dispositive doctrinal con-
sideration. In discussing the Court's construction of the terms of the consent
decree, I suggested that, logically, the most sensible way to get a grasp on the
chimerical intent of the parties was by balancing the competing interests that
were at stake. Once again, however, it turned out that the technique of interest
balancing could only work through recourse to the subjective values of the judge
asked to strike the balance, thereby making it too an unsatisfactory safeguard
against judicial bias. The doctrinal rules became nothing more than a medium
for the judge's discretion, and it was that discretion, rather than the doctrinal
rules, that generated the result.
The third technique for confronting doctrinal ambiguity can best be described
as figuring out what is really going on. In discussing the Court's resolution of
the Title VII issue, I suggested that the essence of the issue related to the individ-
ual, as opposed to the group, nature of discrimination and discrimination reme-
dies. Implicit in reliance on this technique is the belief that legal issues have an
essential nature that can be ascertained if the issues are stared at long enough.
The nature of an issue, however, appears to be nothing more than a function of
the perspective from which it is viewed by the judge, and perspective in turn
appears to be nothing more than a shorthand term for subjectivity. Therefore,
no matter how intensely we stare at legal issues, they are unlikely ever to be
transformed from what they appear to be into what they really are.
In discussing these three particular techniques for confronting doctrinal ambi-
guity, I did not intend to suggest that they were exhaustive. 158 They are the
techniques that I perceive courts to use most often, but other techniques might
be identified. Moreover, I did not intend to suggest that any particular technique
was the proper technique to use for resolution of any particular issue. Each of
the techniques can easily be used to resolve virtually any legal issue. Finally, I
did not intend to suggest that the techniques are mutually exclusive. In fact,
they seem to be quite interrelated. Specification of the interests to be considered
in connection with the interest-balancing technique probably depends upon a
judge's functional analysis of the case, which in turn, is likely to depend upon
how the judge perceives what is really at stake in the litigation, and so on. As a
result, it seems that there is simply no nonsubjective way in which legal doctrine
can be applied, thereby making doctrine an utter failure at the task of guarding
against judicial bias. 159
158. It is, however, my intent to suggest that any other technique would be equally dependent upon
subjective values.
159. I have offered inore elaborate explanations for the necessary presence of bias in judicial decisions
and have suggested that bias must exist no matter how seemingly precise the controlling language formu-
lation might be. See Spann, supra note 88, at 528-36 (arguing that doctrinal indeterminacy pervades all
cases).
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B. ALTERNATE FUNCTIONS
If I am correct that legal doctrine is inherently incapable of guarding against
the subjective values of judges and in fact depends upon subjective values in
order to have meaning, it makes sense to wonder whether legal doctrine serves
any useful purpose at all, or whether we should simply abandon doctrinal rules
and rely instead on direct judicial application of our policy objectives. I have
been able to think of three alternative functions that doctrine might serve, which
could potentially justify its continued presence in the process of legal decision
making. First, doctrine might illuminate the proper factors for judicial consider-
ation, even if it is unable to guard against subjectivity in a judge's consideration
of those factors. Second, doctrine might promote uniformity and consistency in
judicial decisions by channeling whatever subjective values are involved into pre-
dictable and manageable directions. Finally, although doctrine cannot preclude
the presence of subjective values in judicial decisions, it might serve to reduce the
amount of judicial bias that would otherwise be present, thereby holding the
influence of the judge's personal preferences to acceptably low levels. Ulti-
mately, however, none of these alternative justifications proves to be very
satisfying.
Whatever their shortcomings in eliminating subjectivity, doctrinal rules might
nevertheless serve to illuminate the factors that should be considered in resolving
legal issues by distinguishing between what is material and what is legally irrele-
vant. Accordingly, a well-meaning judge tempted to give consideration to an
extraneous factor is instructed by the governing doctrinal rules not to do so.
Assume, for example, that proper resolution of the modification issue in Stotts
turned on proper construction of the consent decree. In determining whether
the Stotts consent decree, by its own terms, prohibited seniority-based layoffs, the
governing contract rules indicated that the intent of the parties in entering into
the decree was to be dispositive. 16° Other factors, such as weather conditions on
the day that the complaint was filed or the judge's assessment of what might best
promote harmonious race relations in Memphis, properly had no bearing on the
decision. Closer examination, however, reveals that doctrine actually does very
little to distinguish between factors that should and should not receive judicial
attention, and whatever it does might well be counterproductive.
Most people would agree that weather conditions on the day that the com-
plaint was filed should have no bearing on proper construction of the consent
decree. But we do not need doctrinal rules to tell us that; it just would not make
any sense to treat weather conditions as a factor. Therefore, if doctrine is to be
useful in illuminating factors, it must be capable of satisfactorily distinguishing
among legitimate contenders for judicial consideration. The judge's assessment
of what construction of the consent decree would best promote harmonious race
relations in Memphis does appear to be a legitimate contender. Doctrine, how-
ever, does not conclusively resolve whether this factor should be considered, and
the resolution suggested on a superficial level may not be satisfactory.
Superficially, a doctrinal instruction to inquire into the intent of the parties
would seem to preclude judicial consideration of what would best promote har-
160. See supra text following note 81 (describing contract law's treatment of parties' intent).
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monious race relations. But, as indicated above, 161 ascertainment of the parties'
intent, if not totally meaningless, is at least a tricky business. Certainly, each
party can be said to have intended the outcome that would maximize that party's
own interests, but those intents conflict and cannot, therefore, constitute the
shared intent of the parties that is relevant under contract law. If one asks the
largely ficticious question of what intent the parties are likely to have shared,
promotion of harmonious race relations becomes a likely candidate. After all,
this was a class action filed against a municipality. Neither side, therefore, was
primarily concerned with advancing any personal interest that might have been
at stake, and the lowest common denominator between their interests may well
have been the parties' joint concern with improving race relations.
Even if the parties can be shown to have possessed a different intent, not in-
volving race relations at all, it still is not clear that we would wish to preclude a
judge from considering race relations as a factor in construing the consent de-
cree. Courts exist to do more than merely enforce private contracts. They are
social institutions that exist to promote the welfare of society. Thus our courts
will not enforce contracts that are unconscionable or illegal, even though the
intent of the parties to have such contracts enforced is beyond question. 162 Be-
cause promotion of harmonious race relations is a high social priority, a doctri-
nal instruction to ignore that factor in construing the decree could easily be
rejected as unacceptable. In the same way, therefore, that doctrine is unable to
preclude the presence of judicial bias, doctrine may also be unable to illuminate
reliably the factors that are entitled to judicial consideration.
There is one additional category of factors that doctrine might properly illu-
minate. That category consists of factors whose relevance to a proper decision
would be generally conceded, but that the judge might simply overlook or under-
value in the absence of doctrinal illumination. For example, statutes of limita-
tions remind a judge that societal interests in finality and repose must be
considered when cases are decided. 163 Because those long-term considerations
are rarely sufficient to override the more immediate substantive concerns
presented in a case where the equities cry out for judicial intervention, their
inclusion in the governing doctrine reminds judges that they must nevertheless
give adequate consideration to those factors. Although the importance of such
factors in isolated cases might seem minimal, doctrine reminds us that their cu-
mulative importance cannot be ignored.
As appealing as this argument might initially appear to be, it once again has
little to do with the existence or content of doctrine. The argument that long-
term as well as short-term consequences should enter into a judge's deliberations
simply suggests that all good arguments should be considered before a case is
decided. When a new factor is persuasively addressed for the first time, it merits
161. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing circularity in resolving unanticipated
problems by resorting to determination of parties' intent).
162. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, at 302-23, 347-58 (discussing public policy reasons for
not enforcing unconscionable or illegal contracts).
163. See generally 53 C.J.S. (2d) Limitations of Actions § 1, at 901-04 (1948) (statutes of limitations
designed to prevent surprise and suppress stale claims after certain period of time). Technically, a statute
of limitations is a statute rather than a judicially developed doctrine. Construction of such statutes, how-
ever, involves judicially developed doctrinal rules, as does application of the related equitable doctrine of
laches.
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consideration even though, by definition, applicable doctrinal rules have not
made it a material factor. Conversely, when doctrine directs a court to give
consideration to a factor that the judge would like to underplay in light of the
more compelling equities of a particular case, the judge can and probably should
be expected to evade the doctrinal prominence accorded that factor, as did the
first judge who decided to toll the statute of limitations because the defendant's
fraud prevented the plaintiff from filing a timely action. Standing alone, there-
fore, doctrine would seem to do little to illuminate factors that properly should
be considered in resolving legal issues.
A second potential justification for doctrine relates to its ability to facilitate
uniformity and consistency in judicial decision making. By providing judges
with guidance in deciding particular cases, doctrinal rules could be said to help
ensure both that individual judges will, over time, decide similar cases in similar
ways and that different judges will resolve similar cases in similar ways. This, of
course, promotes desirable predictability and stability in the legal system. The
argument that doctrine does much to advance these objectives, however, is un-
convincing. In order for doctrine to serve this function, it would have to gener-
ate results, or at least illuminate factors. But, as has been shown, doctrine is not
particularly good at doing either. It is not clear, for example, whether a judge
called upon to construe the Stotts consent decree will consider the effect that
particular constructions may have on future race relations. Some judges will,
and some will not. Therefore, inasmuch as this factor determines the outcome,
governing contract doctrine fails to promote either uniformity or consistency.
To the extent that there is any uniformity or consistency in judicial decisions,
it is just as likely to exist in spite of the doctrinal rules as because of them. A
clear example is provided by the events that followed the Supreme Court's inval-
idation of the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha.164 Strong arguments can be
made that the decision rendered many criminal laws in the District of Columbia
unconstitutional because those laws were enacted pursuant to a statute contain-
ing a nonseverable, unconstitutional veto provision. As a doctrinal result, many
convicted criminals in the District of Columbia might be entitled to have their
convictions overturned, and those who are incarcerated might be entitled to their
release. 165 It is relatively easy, however, to predict that judges in the District of
Columbia simply will not let a large number of criminals go free. The judges will
display a remarkable degree of uniformity and consistency, but they will do so in
spite of-not because of-the seeming demands of doctrine. Accordingly,
whatever is responsible for uniformity and consistency in judicial decisions ap-
pears to operate independent of doctrine. 166
164. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
165. Three consolidated cases presenting particular variants of this argument are presently pending in
the Disrict of Columbia Court of Appeals under the name of Gary v. United States, No. 83-796 (D.C.
argued Oct. 22, 1984).
166. Arguably, there is a principle permitting criminal convictions to be upheld despite the invalidity of
the laws under which the defendants were charged. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the
Supreme Court, in announcing what was essentially a cost-benefit balancing test, held that the degree of
retroactivity to be given changes in applicable law depended upon the particular circumstances involved.
Id. at 627-29. The test was further refined in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), where the Court
identified three factors to be considered in determining the appropriate degree of retroactivity: the purpose
of the new rule; the extent of reliance on the old rule; and the effect of retroactivity on the administration
of justice. Id. at 297. In addition, the pre- or post-conviction stage of proceedings at which the defendant
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Even though doctrine appears to be incapable of tightly controlling judicial
decision making, it might be justifiable as a means of reducing the degree to
which judges are free to give vent to their biases. Perhaps doctrine limits the
scope of judicial discretion even though it is not able to eliminate such discretion
completely. Perhaps judges frequently are tempted to decide cases the way that
they want to, but actually do so only to the extent that they can get away with it
under the governing doctrinal rules.
The theoretical question of whether doctrine imposes any constraint whatso-
ever on judicial discretion is interesting, but unimportant to the present discus-
sion.167 Whatever theoretical limitations may or may not be present, the
practical, day-to-day freedom that doctrinal rules give judges in deciding cases is
quite broad. Stotts illustrates this graphically. Stotts was an important case that
was sure to send out signals about the future course of race relations in the
United States. Nevertheless, few would argue that the justices operated under
any perceptible constraint in resolving the legal issues. The case could easily
have been decided either way.
As a practical matter, judges have near-complete discretion in resolving legal
issues for at least two reasons. First, there are virtually always outcome-determi-
native doctrinal ambiguities that judges can manipulate in accordance with their
subjective values, as consideration of the various legal issues in Stotts reveals.
Second, even if this were not the case, judges could always "cheat" if they de-
sired to reach a particular result badly enough. Despite the fact that there might
be a consensus resolution of a particular legal issue, the judge is by no means
bound to resolve the issue in accordance with that consensus. Even if the judge
lacks the analytical skills to argue convincingly in favor of the result he or she
desires, the judge can, on a limited number of occasions at least, simply assert
the desired result. Arguably, this is precisely what Justice White did in resolving
the mootness issue in Stotts. 168 Moreover, judges can use a variety of techniques
to reduce the likelihood that others will recognize that they have "cheated."
Judges can, for example, resolve the issue in summary fashion with very little
discussion, as Justice White did with respect to the plaintiffs' constitutional
claims in Stott. 169 They can also frame the legal issues in terms of esoteric
technical doctrines relating to things like justiciability and thereby reduce the
seeks recourse to the new rule of law can have significant bearing on the outcome, as can the nature of the
underlying right at issue. Cf Shea v. Louisiana, 53 U.S.L.W. 4173, 4174-75 (U.S., Feb. 20, 1985) and
cases cited therein (discussing factors that affect retroactivity of changes in law). Assuming that retroac-
tivity rules fashioned in a criminal law context also apply in the legislative veto context, the number of
prisoners likely to be released as a result of Chadha would presumably be a factor affecting the degree to
which Chadha should be given retroactive affect In reality, however, the broad retroactivity tests articu-
lated in Linkletter and its progeny cannot fairly be said to constitute a principle capable of constraining
judicial discretion. Rather, the judge making a retroactivity determination seems to be told little more
than to do what seems appropriate under all of the circumstances.
167. I believe that doctrine is completely incapable of imposing any such constraints. See Spann, supra
note 88, at 528-36 (arguing that bias exists in every judicial decision, no matter how seemingly precise the
controlling language formulation).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 38 to 52 (discussing majority's resolution of mootness issue). I
do not, of course, intend to imply that Justice White could not have distinguished the mootness cases that
stood in his way if he had been so inclined. See supra text accompanying notes 68 to 75 (discussing
various judicial techniques to distinguish precedents and avoid finding of mootness).
169. See 104 S. Ct. at 2590 n.16; see also supra note 156 (discussing Justice White's footnote resolution
of constitutional claims).
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number of observers who will appreciate the problems in their analyses. In addi-
tion, judges can increase the scope of their operative discretion through obfusca-
tion and reliance on legal assertions of questionable relevance, as Justice White
arguably did in his footnote resolution of the scope of review issue. 170 As long as
judges do not "cheat" too often, they probably have the latitude to "cheat"
whenever their subjective values tell them that they should. Although limita-
tions in intelligence, creativity, or legal sophistication may limit the scope of a
judge's discretion, doctrine itself does very little to impose meaningful
constraints.
C. SIMPLE JUSTICE
Doctrine is inherently incapable of serving its central functions--constraining
judicial discretion and guarding against the subjective values of judges who re-
solve our legal disputes-because doctrinal rules necessarily depend upon those
subjective values in order to have any meaning. For the same reason, doctrine
also fails to serve any useful alternative function. It is, therefore, tempting to
conclude that we should recognize our doctrinal charade for what it is, and sim-
ply abandon doctrine in favor of direct judicial application of our policy objec-
tives. If judges purport to do nothing more than prevent unjust discrimination,
we can read their decisions free from the mystique of neutral principles and re-
spond accordingly. Indeed, we could even supersede the intermediate formula-
tions of our policy objectives, formulations such as the prevention of unjust
discrimination, and have our judges apply directly our one overriding objective.
We could simply instruct our judges to go forth and do justice.
But there is an air of unreality about all of this. Intuitively, some resolutions of
legal issues are better than others. Intuitively, some functions are better served
by one case outcome than another; some balances are properly struck one way
but not another; and some ways of looking at the essential nature of legal
problems are simply better than others. Moreover, to the extent that judges per-
ceive these things to be true, their actions are very likely to be constrained. Obvi-
ously, something is wrong. Doctrine cannot both depend upon subjective values
for its meaning and yet guard against subjectivity in legal analysis. What is
wrong is that we have it all exactly backwards.
Legal doctrine does not constrain judicial decision making. Rather, it is judi-
cial decision making that constrains doctrine. Legal doctrine can be best under-
stood as an attempt by a collection of individual jurists to ascertain and
articulate the prevailing values of their society. For example, the reason that the
equal protection clause means something different in 1985 than it meant in 1885
is not because the language of the clause changed but because the social values
that the clause is intended to implement have changed. The way we know that
the underlying values have changed is because our judges have told us so. But
how do the judges know? The only way that the judges can know is by interpret-
ing what they perceive to be going on in the society around them. Their inter-
pretations may be based on a wealth of data derived from oral arguments,
political polls, or urban riots, but they are interpretations nevertheless. Like ju-
170. See 104 S. Ct. at 2585 n.8; see also supra note 77 (discussing Justice White's characterization and
resolution of scope of review issue).
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dicial interpretations of doctrine, judicial interpretations of prevailing social
norms necessarily depend upon the subjective values of the judges in order to
have any meaning. Therefore, to the extent that doctrine is simply an outgrowth
of individual decisions either of numerous common law courts or numerous
Supreme Court Justices, it takes its shape from whatever forces constrain judicial
decisions. And judicial decisions are constrained only by the subjective prefer-
ences of the judges who issue them. The presence or absence of doctrine hardly
seems to matter. Like it or not, it appears that our judges are indeed dispensing
simple justice.
III. CONCLUSION
My theory is that there is not much difference between subjective values and
neutral principles-simple justice is not much different from the complicated
kind. If that is so, the quest for constraints on judicial bias is probably mis-
guided; in any event it is certainly futile. Recently, legal scholars have begun to
abandon the quest and to reconceive the nature of the legal system in a way that
is not dependent upon principled constraint of our legal decision makers. 171 It is
not clear what such a reconceived legal system would look like, but transcending
the artifical distinction between principle and bias is almost certain to be an
advance.
171. See Tushnet, supra note 89, and commentators discussed therein.
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